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Foreword
by the Chair of  
the Commission
The University of Birmingham Policy Commission on the Distribution of Wealth  
focuses on inequalities of wealth, rather than of income.
We report at a time of global economic uncertainty, with a crisis of confidence in  
those once-staid guardians of wealth, banks and governments. At the same time  
there are springing up hopeful, local, civic social inclusion initiatives. At each level,  
the Commission offers policy challenges that engage with fiscal frameworks, asset 
holding and management, and the complex processes of moving from crippling 
household debt to wealth accumulation. 
Western attitudes to and behaviour about wealth, rooted in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, are well described by Peter Brown in ‘Through the Eye of the Needle’1.  
Now, as then, we experience individuals and society swinging back and forth between 
selfish power, self-denying poverty, sanctified philanthropy and judicious distribution. 
Up-to-date research on, and analysis of, wealth in the developed economies at various 
levels has been made available to the Commission. We are most grateful to all those 
who have contributed, locally and internationally, from the richest to the poorest: 
academic colleagues, specialists, activists, and members of the public. 
The parable of Jesus, with its memorable phrase, ‘I will pull down my barns and build 
greater,’2 criticises not the farmer’s successful generation of overflowing wealth, but 
what he does with it, his relationship with it, and the dire consequences of its misuse.
The debate in which we are engaged affirms the necessary good of wealth. Our 
questions are: to what extent is the unequal distribution of wealth a help or a hindrance 
to human flourishing? What can be done to enable more people to prosper?
Rt Revd David Urquhart
Bishop of Birmingham
bishop@birmingham.anglican.org
@David_Urq
1   Princeton, 2012
2   Holy Bible, Luke 12:16-20 
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Introduction
  In October 2012, the University  
of Birmingham launched the Policy 
Commission on the Distribution of 
Wealth. The Commission had three 
main aims: to review existing 
knowledge on wealth inequality; to 
question the extent to which wealth 
inequality is a problem; and to consider 
appropriate policy responses to wealth 
inequality. A broader aim of the 
Commission was to promote debate 
around the issue of wealth inequality.
  Competing ideas of wealth were at the 
heart of the work of this Commission 
when we set out. The balance of 
wealth, some argued, appeared to 
have shifted in a fundamental way,  
both in terms of a less even distribution 
of people who were able to share in 
prosperity and also in terms of a 
perceived decline of the quality or 
sustainability of the social, civic and 
natural environment, just as the reach 
of financial factors in decision-making 
was larger than ever. 
  There are more forms of wealth/capital 
than those that are measured in 
traditional economic terms. One  
model presents four forms of capital 
– environmental capital, human capital 
(including knowledge, skills and 
health), physical capital and social/
organisational capital (including legal, 
political, community, family, 
organisational and corporate). Our 
focus, however, was on personal 
wealth in the form of housing wealth, 
pension wealth and savings.
  The distribution of personal wealth is 
highly unequal with the overall share  
of the top tenth of the population in 
2008/10 being more than 850 times 
the share of the bottom tenth. The 
distribution of wealth is much more 
unequal than the distribution of income. 
Whereas those at the (top) ninetieth 
percentile for income or earnings 
receive four times as much as those  
at the (bottom) tenth percentile, the 
ratio for wealth is 77 times.
  Wealth inequalities occur through a 
number of mechanisms. Some people 
have higher incomes than others and 
so have the opportunity to accumulate 
more wealth. Some people have similar 
amounts of income but choose to 
accumulate wealth rather than spend. 
Some people have wealthy parents 
and receive higher levels of 
inheritance/lifetime gifts. And some 
people have the wisdom or good  
luck to invest in housing and financial 
assets just before they increase 
substantially in value. We may wish  
to treat these different forms of wealth 
accumulation differently when 
designing policy instruments.
  There are many gaps in our knowledge 
about wealth inequality. Some of these 
Summary
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are empirical: for example we know 
very little about the ‘super rich’ as the 
Office for National Statistics no longer 
publishes data on this group using  
the estate multiplier method. And 
international comparative data is  
still rather limited. But there are also 
gaps in our theorising around wealth. 
What is wealth? How might we 
distinguish between groups with 
different levels of wealth? And why 
does wealth matter?
Does wealth inequality 
matter?
  Personal wealth has become 
increasingly important in recent years 
and will continue to be so as we 
experience the longest and deepest 
slump in a century, with social security 
benefits being cut. Unemployment 
remains high and average incomes are 
stagnating, if not falling, while prices 
rise. Precautionary savings are 
therefore particularly important as a 
financial cushion to meet unexpected 
expenses; yet many people lack even  
a small cushion of this kind. 
  Wealth affects health. There is strong 
evidence that people with wealth have 
higher levels of physical and mental 
well-being than those without, after 
controlling for other factors. People 
with debts are likely to have lower 
levels of mental well-being.
  Wealth affects education and 
employment opportunities. There is a 
strong link between parental wealth 
and children’s educational attainment, 
independent of any income effect. 
Young people with wealth also do 
better later in life (eg, in terms of 
employment).
  The impact of wealth inequality on 
society and politics more generally  
are difficult to pin down as accurately 
as the impact on individuals. But it  
has been argued that the wealthy 
become insulated from the lives of 
others, leading to social fractures.  
The ability of the wealthy to gain 
greater influence in the corridors of 
power is also a potential threat to 
democratic processes.
  Wealth and income inequalities  
are sometimes defended as being 
important in relation to economic 
growth, as the opportunity to 
accumulate high levels of income  
and wealth may provide incentives for 
entrepreneurship or high levels of effort 
and performance. But there is a lack of 
strong evidence for this.
  Wealth can be accumulated in different 
ways and these may relate to notions 
of fairness. Some of them (eg, through 
hard work and efforts to save from 
income) may be seen as more  
‘worthy’ than others (eg, receiving  
a large inheritance).
  Wealth clearly matters. But there is  
still much more thinking and empirical 
research to be done on what it is that 
matters, and for whom. Our report 
concentrates on three groups: those 
with very little, no or negative wealth; 
those ‘in the middle’ with some assets; 
and those ‘at the top’.
Those with very little, no or 
negative wealth
  Low levels of income are a concern  
as they reduce the ability to avoid  
debt and/or accumulate saving.  
Ways of raising incomes, for example 
through a living wage policy, greater 
worker representation in companies 
and/or training to raise skill levels  
need consideration.
  Levels of problem debt have been 
increasing in recent years and look  
set to increase still further with the 
introduction of welfare reforms which 
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will both reduce the amount of benefit 
received by various groups and also 
change the ways in which people 
receive it. The impact of benefit  
reform needs careful scrutiny.
  Debt advice is crucial here but there 
has been a reduction in funding for 
some forms of debt advice (eg, through 
Law Centres). Continued, and indeed 
increasing, support for debt advice is 
essential to support people, particularly 
through these difficult economic times.
  Credit Unions are, potentially, an ideal 
vehicle for supporting people in terms 
of: money advice; affordable credit; 
transactional banking services; and 
savings schemes. Credit Unions are 
receiving government investment but 
they need much higher levels, not least 
because of the low level of interest 
they (are constrained to) charge.
  The financial services sector also 
needs to play its part here. Payday 
lending is currently under the scrutiny 
of the Competition Commission; and 
the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards has warned the 
banks to improve the services they 
provide to people on low incomes.  
The development of new technologies 
(mobile banking etc) could also be 
used to help people manage and  
save their money.
  People on low incomes receive much 
less support for saving than those on 
middle and high incomes. For example, 
those who are below the income tax 
thresholds do not benefit from tax-free 
savings products like Individual 
Savings Accounts (ISAs). And higher 
rate tax payers benefit more than 
standard rate tax payers. The Saving 
Gateway was a policy designed to 
provide incentives/rewards to those  
on low incomes who nevertheless 
managed to save by providing a match 
(50p for every pound saved up to a 
threshold). Further thought needs to  
be given to how such a scheme can  
be funded.
  Other ways of encouraging saving 
should also be developed including 
auto-enrolment into savings accounts 
when people start a new job and ‘save 
the change’ savings accounts linked to 
credit and debit cards. Means tests on 
savings for workers receiving Universal 
Credit should also be reviewed as  
a possible disincentive to save for  
such groups.
  There is currently no organisation 
which solely represents the interests  
of savers and this is something which 
could be established, for example, 
using the fees which savers pay to the 
financial services industry and which 
are currently used to fund trade bodies 
and regulators.
Those ‘in the middle’ with 
some assets
  Those ‘in the middle’ of the wealth 
distribution tend have some housing 
and pension wealth or the ability to 
accumulate some. But there are a 
number of difficulties facing these 
groups, not least getting a foot on  
the housing ladder and the ability  
of owner-occupiers to access some  
of their housing wealth to maintain  
or increase their living standards, 
particularly in retirement.
  Since the credit crunch it has become 
much more difficult for people to get  
a foot on the housing ladder. The 
government’s ‘Funding for Lending 
Scheme’ does, more recently, appear 
to have helped here with mortgage 
lending increasing in 2012/2013 
(though finance to small and medium- 
sized enterprises is still an issue). 
However, government support for 
lending props up the relatively high 
house prices which are also part of the 
problem. Prices, ideally, need to come 
down, not least by increasing supply. 
But those with housing wealth may not 
be enthusiastic about such policies.
  Younger people are increasingly relying 
on the ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ but this 
reinforces inequalities based on 
whether or not young people have 
been born into wealthy families.
  One interesting idea to consider  
here is to separate – for all forms of 
accommodation – the cost of housing 
services from the returns on residential 
property investment, potentially 
removing some affordability barriers 
from owner occupation while enabling 
renters to benefit from house price 
appreciation (much as they benefit 
from savings linked to interest rates)  
if they wish. This would pave the way 
for housing policy to focus on providing 
people with secure and affordable 
homes of a high standard rather than 
promoting particular tenure types.
  For those who have accumulated 
housing wealth, often as the 
centrepiece of their wealth portfolio, 
ways of helping them access their 
equity safely (without adding to 
unsustainable debts) and cost-
effectively (especially in older age) 
should also be explored. In particular, 
there is interest in equity release 
among consumers and the financial 
services industry but very few people 
take advantage of such mechanisms, 
possibly due to the costs and risks 
involved in such products (on both 
sides). Some ways to share the risks, 
perhaps involving government, might 
be helpful here.
  Pensions are vital to provide decent 
incomes in later life. In recent decades, 
governments have sought to 
encourage private pension provision 
rather than reliance on state pensions, 
but this strategy has not, so far, proved 
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successful for a number of reasons 
and inequalities in private pension 
provision are significant.
  Auto enrolment appears to be working 
well in terms of low opt-out rates and 
this policy, alongside the single tier 
pension, has the potential to increase 
living standards in retirement as the 
population ages. But small businesses 
are likely to need more support as the 
policy is rolled out among them and 
savers will need to save more than the 
default rate in order to reach the kind 
of income levels in retirement that most 
people aspire to. 
  The decline of Defined Benefit  
pension schemes in favour of Defined 
Contribution schemes is a particular 
concern here as savers have little idea 
of how much money they will receive  
in retirement. The development of 
Defined Ambition schemes, which 
share the risk between saver, employer 
(and potentially state) could help here  
but there have been few concrete 
advances here and employers  
and the pensions industry appear 
lukewarm about the idea.
Those ‘at the top’
  This Commission is focusing on  
wealth but a key way in which wealth  
is accumulated is through saving  
from earned income. Over the last 30 
years income inequality has grown 
dramatically and those at the very top 
of the income distribution have seen 
huge increases in their incomes which 
have subsequently fed through into 
wealth inequalities. Those on high 
incomes are also much more likely to 
receive an inheritance and/or lifetime 
gift and much more likely to receive 
one of high value.
  The 2013 Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards has proposed  
‘a radical re-shaping of remuneration’ 
in the finance sector and, more 
broadly, the UK is giving shareholders 
a binding say on pay policy and the 
powers to consider the differentials 
between the lowest and median paid 
workers but greater transparency and 
power for shareholders is vital for 
ensuring fairer rewards for work. 
  Ensuring fair rewards for work, not just 
‘at the top’ but also for those on lower 
wages, will create a fairer distribution  
of ‘original income’ thus reducing any 
need for redistribution. 
  There is often great disagreement 
about the overall level of income and 
wealth taxation but, whatever the level, 
there is then a question about the 
balance between these two types  
of taxation (and the balance between 
these and other forms of taxation).  
The Mirrlees Review called for a  
range of reforms of wealth taxation  
and these should be considered by  
the government.
  The UK does not currently have an 
annual wealth tax but council tax plays 
part of a role here. This tax is over-ripe 
for reform either whole-sale or through 
incremental change (eg, the introduction 
of new bands at the top). The scope 
for a mansion tax and a land tax also 
needs more public consideration.
  If earned wealth is generally considered 
more worthy than unearned wealth, 
then reform of inheritance tax should 
be seriously reviewed. Turning this into 
a capital receipts tax rather than an 
estate tax, and capturing lifetime gifts 
in a more comprehensive way would 
make this a fairer tax though the 
practical and political challenges 
should not be underestimated. Further 
study of Ireland’s tax system in this 
regard could be very fruitful.
  Further reform of Capital Gains  
Tax (CGT) is called for, potentially 
including a return to its application  
at marginal rates of income to reflect 
the nature of capital gains as an 
alternative form of income that is 
available to those with assets to  
call on when needed.
  Alongside wealth taxation, the  
wealthy could be encouraged to make 
increased charitable donations. One 
way of achieving this could be through 
further tax incentives but this runs the 
risk of encouraging tax avoidance. A 
government review of ways to support 
philanthropy would be welcome.
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Policy recommendations
For those on the lowest incomes 
  Funding for debt advice and Credit 
Unions should be increased
  Regulation of payday lending should 
be enforced and toughened
  ‘Saving Gateway’, a matched-savings 
scheme devised to encourage/reward 
saving by people on low incomes, 
should be revived
  Automatic enrolment into a saving 
account for people starting a new job 
should be considered
  Means-testing on savings for workers 
receiving Universal Credit should  
be reviewed
  A not-for-profit organisation to 
represent the interests of savers 
should be established
  Low incomes of those on benefits and 
in work are at the root of many of the 
issues raised in this report. Ways of 
increasing these incomes need to  
be implemented
 
For those ‘in the middle’,  
with some assets
  Housing policy needs to be reviewed 
to ensure supply meets demand  
and avoids merely propping up  
house prices
  Innovation in housing finance should 
be explored to boost affordability and 
help renters benefit from housing 
investment returns, though with 
suitable regulation
  Measures to help people access  
the equity in their homes should be 
reviewed to find ways to share the risk 
between home-owners, lenders and, 
potentially, government
  Incentives to increase the amount 
saved in occupational pensions should 
be investigated for those on low and 
middle incomes
  Ways of putting into practice the 
principles of a ‘Defined Ambition’ 
pension, which shares the risk between 
saver, employer and the state, should 
be identified
For those ‘at the top’
  Inheritance tax should be transformed 
into a capital receipts tax that also 
captures lifetime gifts
  Shareholders should be given a 
binding say on pay policy and the 
power to consider the differentials 
between the lowest and median  
paid workers
  Council Tax needs to be reformed 
– either by a wholesale review or the 
introduction of new bands at the top
  Fresh consideration should be given  
to proposals for a mansion tax and/or  
a land tax
  Parity across the tenure divide in  
the treatment of returns on savings/
investment should be reviewed
  Further reform of Capital Gains Tax is 
needed to reflect the nature of capital 
gains as an alternative form of income
  Measures to encourage philanthropic 
giving (without encouraging tax 
avoidance) should be brought forward
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Background
In October 2012, the University 
of Birmingham launched a Policy 
Commission on the Distribution of 
Wealth. The Commission had three main 
aims: to review existing knowledge on 
wealth inequality; to question the extent to 
which wealth inequality is a problem; and 
to consider appropriate policy responses 
to wealth inequality. A broader aim of 
the Commission was to promote debate 
around the issue of wealth inequality.
This report summarises key ideas  
and evidence arising from the work of  
the Commission which has included 
evidence-gathering, public debates and 
opinion polling. The views expressed in 
this report reflect the discussions of the 
Commission and the input received but 
do not necessarily reflect the personal 
views of the Commissioners or those  
who contributed evidence. The 
Commissioners were:
The Right Reverend David Urquhart,  
Chair of the Commission and Lord Bishop 
of Birmingham
Professor Karen Rowlingson, Academic 
Lead and Professor of Social Policy and 
Director of CHASM, The University of 
Birmingham
Professor Andy Mullineux, Academic Lead 
and Professor of Financial Economics, 
Bournemouth University 
Phillip Blond, Director, ResPublica
Dr Paul Cox, Senior Lecturer of  
Finance, Birmingham Business School, 
The University of Birmingham
Paul Johnson, Director of the Institute  
for Fiscal Studies
Professor Ruth Lister CBE, Emeritus 
Professor of Social Policy, Loughborough 
University; Baroness Lister of Burtersett
Professor Andy Lymer, Professor of 
Accounting and Taxation, Birmingham 
Business School, The University of 
Birmingham
Ed Mayo, Secretary General of  
Co-operatives UK
Professor Stephen McKay, Distinguished 
Professor of Social Research, The 
University of Lincoln
Sir Brian Pomeroy CBE, Former Chair  
of the Financial Inclusion Task Force
Professor Susan J. Smith, Honorary 
Professor of Geography and Mistress  
of Girton College, Cambridge
The Commission produced an initial paper 
summarising some of the key facts on the 
distribution of wealth in December 2012. 
This paper defined wealth and drew on 
key sources of data, particularly the 
Wealth and Assets Survey reports from 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS 
2009; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Another 
key source was the report from the 
National Equality Panel (NEP 2010).  
Introduction
12 Birmingham Policy Commission on the Distribution of Wealth
The paper also leant heavily on 
Rowlingson and McKay (2012). Following 
the publication of this key facts paper, 
John Hills and colleagues at the London 
School of Economics have published 
Wealth in the UK: Distribution, 
Accumulation and Policy, and this is 
another important source of information 
and ideas in this area. The Commission 
also set out a series of questions to 
explore through evidence-gathering and 
debates (see Appendix A). A summary  
of the Commission work programme  
and evidence gathered is included in  
Appendix B.
This chapter: discusses the nature of 
wealth and why it matters; briefly reviews 
what we know about the distribution of 
wealth (see Rowlingson 2012 and Hills  
et al. 2013 for further information); and 
identifies some key gaps in knowledge. 
The next chapter discusses the evidence 
and arguments around whether or not 
wealth inequality is a problem. The 
remaining chapters consider appropriate 
policy responses to wealth inequality. 
The nature of wealth 
The legend of King Midas dates back  
to the early days of Greek mythology  
and tells the story of a King for whom 
everything that he touched turned to gold. 
Like all folk stories, the tale can be told in 
different ways. Aristotle reports that he 
died of hunger. Other versions say that  
he was rescued by the gods, when he 
repented after turning his daughter, Zoe 
(or ‘life’) into gold. Here, one story that 
has lasted over centuries presents the 
concept and conundrum of wealth. Is 
wealth the accumulation of money and 
property that can enable us to do the 
things that what we want to do, or is it 
those things themselves? 
The artist and critic John Ruskin in the 
nineteenth century declared that there  
is no wealth but life and in doing so, he 
was declaring himself for King Midas’ 
daughter: family, relationships, purpose, 
meaning, wellbeing – these to Ruskin  
are the true wealth. But the story of King 
Midas doesn’t necessarily line up so 
neatly with that. Legends never do. He  
was, after all, already a King, with kingly 
possessions and a kingdom’s obedience. 
So, an alternative interpretation is that 
wealth may be gold – something that is 
scarce, desired, tradeable – but there  
are limits to wealth. In wealth, as in life, 
balance is everything.
These competing ideas of wealth were at 
the heart of the work of this Commission 
when we set out. The balance of wealth, 
some argued, appeared to have shifted in 
a fundamental way, in terms of a less even 
distribution of people who were able to 
share in prosperity. It had shifted also in 
terms of a perceived decline in the quality 
or sustainability of the social, civic and 
natural environment, just as the reach of 
financial factors in decision-making was 
larger than ever. 
However, as with the legends of old, 
these are stories that have life that is 
sometimes unconstrained by the facts  
and evidence to back them. We all have  
a tendency to look to stories that confirm 
our existing beliefs, rather than to keep a 
genuinely open mind. The Commission, 
with the open mind and social science 
track record of the University of 
Birmingham behind it, is therefore  
an attempt to explore the facts that  
lie behind one of the most enduring 
challenges of our day – how to generate 
wealth and prosperity in ways that are 
self-reinforcing rather than self-defeating. 
For this task, we have to start with some 
clearer assumptions. We will assume, to 
begin with, that there is more to life than 
Midas’ gold. Gold is scarce, famously so, 
and tradeable, reliably so. It is emblematic 
of wealth, in the sense that a stock of 
wealth today is something that we believe 
will promote a flow of benefits and 
entitlements tomorrow. The term ‘capital’ 
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captures both this sense of wealth and 
offers an accounting framework for how 
future benefits may be valued or, if your 
wealth is in a form akin to a metal that 
rusts, depreciated. There are, of course, 
more forms of capital than money or 
precious metals – we can include, 
typically, land, labour and physical 
structures and equipment – but, 
conventionally, the value of such capital 
can still be measured in terms of money.  
It is not gold, but, with a reference price, 
wealth in this model of capital could in 
nominal terms be counted into gold coins.
What marked out King Midas, though, 
was not that he had a lot of gold. That is  
a different legend, the one of Croesus. It 
was that he loved gold so much that he 
turned other things, including those that 
had value of a different form, into gold.  
In terms of economics, this comes to the 
heart of the issue of wealth – what forms 
and combinations of capital combine to 
increase the flow of benefits and services 
more widely. How wealth is spent is 
easier to trace. How wealth is created 
over time in the most effective way 
remains, if not a mystery, certainly  
a conundrum. 
There can, for example, be more forms of 
capital than those that are measured in 
traditional economic terms. One model of 
this is to characterise four forms of capital 
– environmental capital, human capital 
(including knowledge, skills and health), 
physical capital and social/organisational 
capital (including legal, political, 
community, family, organisation and  
firms). This feels more encompassing,  
but, in turn, less likely to be reduced to 
the calculus of money. Even if there are 
attempts from time to time to do just that, 
putting a price, or a shadow price, on 
what is outside of conventional markets  
in order to understand or adjust for wealth 
that can’t be counted in gold – there are 
limits. What price parenthood? What 
price the butterfly?
There is a long tradition of radical 
economic thinking that argues that prices 
established in money terms in the context 
of a market trade between two or more 
parties are blind to these wider forms of 
potential wealth, because they suggest 
that it is possible or even desirable to 
cash them in for money. John Ruskin,  
in the nineteenth century context of the 
British Industrial Revolution, had a name 
for this. He distinguished ‘wealth’, as life 
giving, and ‘illth’ as economic activity that 
created ugliness and unhappiness. One 
hundred years later, Kennedy sparked a 
debate that continues today about the 
measurement of wealth in national 
accounts – again contrasting what is 
measured in economic terms as wealth  
as measuring all but that which makes life 
worthwhile. The Nobel Prize economist 
Herbert Simon argued that most wealth 
was created on the back of a common 
inheritance from previous generations.  
A more recent prize winner, the late Elinor 
Ostrom, focused on wealth outside of the 
market, in the form of commons.
The challenges these perspective  
throw up are more than the issues of 
unconsidered costs, which might lead you 
to consider such ‘externalities’, or narrow 
measurement, which might tell you to 
broaden your national accounts or 
indicators of progress. The crunch issue 
is the extent to which we can draw  
down one form of capital in order to build 
another. After all, it has been a hallmark  
of modern economic development that it 
draws into the market those activities that 
were previously outside of the field of 
monetary exchange, whether household 
work or subsistence farming. Some forms 
of capital, though, cannot simply be 
cashed in. Some environmental assets, 
such as the diversity of species, may have 
a value beyond a narrow market price 
(that is, in turn, ‘discounted’ over time, 
leading inexorably to a short-term view of 
what may be long-run assets). But they 
may also be critical to our survival, in 
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which case no amount of monetary gain 
will capture quite what we are doing. This 
is the argument of Herman Daly, a pioneer 
in the field of ecological economics. What 
we take for economic growth is, in his 
words, uneconomic growth.
In short, then, to assume that wealth is 
narrowly financial is as impoverished an 
account of economic life as assumptions 
of poverty that start and end with income 
and expenditure. It is important, but far 
from the whole story – and in turn may  
be a framing that becomes problematic, 
for example if today’s economics rights 
and rents are at odds with a climate 
constrained world tomorrow. Today’s 
wealth may not be that of tomorrow. 
A project to explore the relationships, 
synergies and trade-offs between different 
forms of capital would have many merits, 
but it was not in fact our chosen remit. 
We chose to start with financial wealth,  
in a more or less traditional economic 
sense, because this itself is a neglected  
field of study and understanding. We 
recognise the limits, but by taking a 
narrower remit, we were aiming both  
to be of more practical policy use and 
potentially to offer findings that would 
make for greater consensus.
So, with these caveats in mind, what in 
fact is wealth?
1.  We start with people. Household 
wealth is the stock of assets ‘owned’ 
by individuals or households. The 
assets may be financial or physical  
eg, houses. Individuals invest or save 
by purchasing financial claims on 
banks (deposits) and other financial 
instruments (bonds and shares). The 
issuers of these claims and instruments 
enter into contracts requiring them  
to pay a return (interest on deposits, 
‘coupons’ on bonds and dividends  
on shares). Such financial assets (or 
instruments or claims) are often issued 
to raise funds for investment in a 
business or enterprise, often in pursuit 
of profit, but not exclusively so (eg, 
co-operatives, other mutuals and 
ethical investments). 
2.  Saving is expected to generate  
an income and/or capital gain to 
compensate for abstention from the 
immediate consumption of goods and 
services using the income stream from 
which it is saved. Saving is therefore  
a means of providing for future 
consumption by the savers, or perhaps 
their children if it can be transferred to 
them. The income generated through 
saving is generally liable for income tax, 
though sometimes this is waived to 
encourage saving. 
3.  If the financial assets held in investors’ 
(savers’) portfolios appreciate in value 
because their prices rise on financial 
markets, then there is gain in their 
capital value and, when the assets are 
sold, a capital gains tax (CGT) is due. 
In order to incentivise investment, CGT 
is commonly levied at a lower rate than 
the higher rates of income tax, or 
corporation tax (on profits made by 
enterprises through producing and 
selling goods and services). 
4.  Household investments in residential 
property other than household’s 
principal residence are liable to CGT. 
Home ownership is the main form of 
wealth holding for many households, 
although shareholding, especially 
vicariously through pension fund 
holdings, can exceed their housing 
wealth where pension entitlements are 
relatively large. The wealth value of a 
house to a household is its equity or 
net worth, which is the difference  
between its potential sale price and  
the associated debt (mortgage or 
home loan) outstanding. Net worth is  
a commonly used term for net wealth 
(wealth net of debt).
5.  The value of wealth depends not just 
on the underlying asset prices, but  
also on the prices of the goods and 
services that could be purchased with 
it. Real wealth, in the economic sense, 
is thus the value of wealth, or ‘what 
someone is worth’, and is thus  
the nominal or measured wealth at 
prevailing market prices deflated by  
an index of prices of good and services 
(the consumer or retail price index 
being the most pertinent one for 
households) to determine what the 
money will buy. 
6.  Growth in real wealth, or wealth 
accumulation, is the difference 
between the growth in nominal wealth 
and the rate on inflation, or the rise in 
the price index over a period of time. 
Wealth accumulation can thus result 
from either a rise in the price of the 
underlying assets that is faster than 
inflation or from the creation of new 
wealth. Asset price inflation in excess 
of consumer price inflation can reflect 
an imbalance between the demand  
and supply of the underlying assets eg, 
housing, where supply is slow to rise  
in response to increased demand  
for a number of reasons. It might 
alternatively reflect speculative 
investment. 
If this is wealth, at least in a traditional 
sense, then how is it created? This in 
essence is the question at the heart of  
all debates around economic policy.  
This Commission sidesteps some of  
these issues, as important as they are, 
again for the reason that they are ones 
better and more comprehensively dealt 
with elsewhere. We do recognise that 
these are assumptions that can be 
questioned. If you took a broader 
conception of wealth, to include family, 
community and the environment, then  
you would define who are wealth creators 
differently and promote a different model 
of wealth creation.
In simple terms though, the greater the 
genuine real wealth creation, the faster 
and more sustainably an economy can 
grow. Workers and entrepreneurs (‘risk 
takers’) should be fairly remunerated, or 
incentivised, and those who work harder 
(or are born with special talents) will earn 
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more income. They can then choose to 
spend it, or save it to accumulate wealth. 
That choice is one that is important to 
unpack: what after all is the motive for 
wealth accumulation? Why save,  
rather than spend, spend, spend? The 
Victorian view was that this was about 
responsibility. The recently refurbished 
Birmingham TSB (formerly Municipal) 
Bank, has around the rim of its domed 
ceiling a number of aphorisms such as: 
’saving radiates happiness’; and ‘saving  
is the mother of riches’. Today, credit 
unions, which are saving and loans 
co-operatives, encourage potential 
borrowers to build up a track record  
of saving, however small, as a means of 
demonstrating that they can live off less 
than their income and hence can repay 
loans. The message is that even the 
relatively poor can save and should be 
encouraged do so to build up personal 
wealth, however meagre.
Wealth, or savings, can help smooth 
consumption in the face of irregular 
income streams. Saving is thus a form of 
self-insurance. Further, over the life cycle, 
savings can provide income in retirement, 
above and beyond any state provision 
through compulsory ‘National Insurance’ 
contributions/taxes. In addition younger 
households may need to save to put  
down a deposit when buying a house. 
The possession of wealth also increases 
access to credit since lenders generally 
prefer to lend to those that have wealth to 
post as collateral. Those who accumulate 
the most wealth, whether through higher 
income or inheritance, enjoy not just a 
higher standard of living, but in theory 
have more opportunities than the non-
wealthy. They can invest in the best 
education for their children, building  
their human capital (and networks and 
connections) and generally improving  
their life chances. 
Wealth matters.
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Wealth, in this paper, refers to a stock of money compared with 
income which is a flow. We focus in this paper on wealth in 
the form of personal assets, particularly private pension wealth, 
housing wealth, financial wealth and personal possessions. 
Wealth can be accumulated from: savings 
from income; gifts/inheritances; and 
increases in asset values (eg, property  
or share prices). Income sources include 
employment, self-employment, social 
security payments and interest from 
savings. The sources of income and 
wealth may be important in terms of  
policy responses. Wealth accumulated by 
people saving money from earnt income 
might be treated differently, for example, 
to that accumulated through ‘unearnt’ 
inheritances. Wealth accumulated through 
‘normal’ rises in share or property prices 
might also be treated differently to that 
accumulated through ‘super’ returns on 
shares or property values.
The distribution of wealth is highly 
unequal with the overall share of the  
top tenth of the population in 2008–10 
being more than 850 times the share  
of the bottom tenth (Hills et al 2013).  
The distribution of wealth is much more 
unequal than the distribution of income. 
Whereas those at the (top) 90th 
percentile for income or earnings  
receive four times as much as those  
at the (bottom) tenth percentile, the ratio 
for wealth is seventy-seven times (Hills  
et al. 2013)
These figures include all types of 
household wealth, including private 
pensions, housing and personal 
possessions. But if we just focus on 
financial wealth (‘liquid’ savings, stocks, 
shares etc) then the picture is even more 
unequal. A quarter of the population have 
negative net financial wealth (ie, debts) 
while just over 10 per cent have net 
financial wealth of over £100,000.
Wealth inequalities are linked to age and 
we would expect that older people have 
had more time to accumulate assets than 
younger people. Those in the 55-64 year 
old age group had the highest levels of 
total wealth of all age groups in 2006/8, 
with a median of £416,000. However, 
there is also considerable inequality within 
this age group. One in ten had less than 
£28,000 of total wealth compared with 
the top one in ten who had more than 
£1.3 million. 
Some groups have particularly low levels 
of wealth. For example, one in ten social 
tenant households aged 55-64 had net 
assets of no more than £3000 in 2006/8 
including personal possessions such  
as furniture. A tenth of manual worker 
households had less than £8000 assets 
at the same age. At the top end, median 
wealth for professional households 
exceeded £900,000 (including private 
and occupational pension rights)  
(National Equality Panel 2010).
There is also considerable variation by  
a range of factors including ethnicity, 
religion, occupation and region. Those 
from Black African and Bangladeshi 
groups have particularly low levels of 
wealth, as do Muslims. Those in more 
professional occupations have much 
The distribution
of wealth
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higher levels of wealth. Those living in the 
South East and London having particularly 
high rates of wealth, not least housing 
wealth. It is difficult, conceptually and 
practically, to distinguish between men 
and women’s wealth in couples. The 
picture is also complex if we look at  
single person families as the mean level  
of single men’s wealth is higher than 
single women’s but the top 30 per cent  
of single women had higher wealth than 
the top 30 per cent of single men. Lone 
parents, mostly women, however, have 
particularly low levels of wealth.
Wealth inequalities occur through a 
number of mechanisms. Some people 
have higher incomes than others and  
so have the opportunity to accumulate 
more wealth. Some people have similar 
amounts of income but choose to 
accumulate wealth rather than spend. 
Some people have wealthy parents and 
receive higher levels of inheritance/lifetime 
gifts. And some people have the wisdom 
or good luck to invest in housing and 
financial assets just before they increase 
substantially in value. As mentioned 
above, we may wish to treat these 
different forms of wealth accumulation 
differently when designing policy 
instruments.
The dramatic increase in very high 
incomes from the 1980s onwards is  
likely to be a key factor explaining wealth 
inequalities. A very small group of earners 
at the top were then able to accumulate 
particularly high levels of wealth. In the 
1970s, those in the top 1 percentile 
received six per cent of total income  
but by the end of the 2000s this had 
increased to 15 per cent (Bell and van 
Reenen 2013). And figures released  
in June 2013 by HMRC suggest that 
18,000 people now earn at least  
£1m per year – the highest number ever 
recorded. This compares with 10,000 in 
2010/11 and ‘only’ 4,000 in 1999/2000 
(Boffey 2013). Those in higher social 
classes are also much more likely to 
receive an inheritance and/or lifetime gift 
and much more likely to receive one of 
high value.
There is much more data on trends in 
income inequality than wealth inequality. 
The main long-term trend was for income 
and wealth inequality to fall during most  
of the twentieth century until the 1980s 
when inequality began to grow. Between 
1995 and 2005, absolute differences in 
wealth inequality widened considerably 
due to house price rises (Hills et al. 
2013). Those with low or no housing 
wealth were left further behind the rest. 
But those with average amounts of wealth 
became better off relative to those higher 
1  This method uses information from the probate or Inheritance Tax process on the wealth held in estates left on death and then grosses up from this using mortality rates to provide estimates of the 
wealth held by the living.
up the wealth distribution and so 
measures of inequality for society as a 
whole (eg, the Gini coefficient) fell during 
this period.
Gaps in evidence
While the new Wealth and Assets Survey 
(WAS) provides rigorous data on the 
wealth of a large sample of members  
of the general public (in 2006/8 and 
2008/10), gaps in knowledge still exist. 
For example, sample surveys, including 
WAS do not cover the wealthiest people 
(those within the top one per cent). This  
is a group that has seen levels of wealth 
increase most dramatically in recent years 
and yet the Office for National Statistics 
appears to have abandoned the long-term 
series on wealth using the estate 
multiplier method1.
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There is also a gap in evidence in relation 
to international comparisons of wealth 
inequality. The Luxembourg Wealth 
Survey provides some data here but 
analysts have some concerns about how 
comparable the data actually is and the 
questions covered are rather limited  
(see Cowell 2013).
Finally, as well as gaps in terms  
of evidence, there is also a gap in 
theorisation about what it means to be 
wealthy or rich (see Rowlingson and 
McKay 2011; Scott 1994). Compared  
to over a century of academic discussion 
about the conceptualisation, definition and 
measurement of poverty, there is very little 
discussion about where a ‘wealth line’ 
might be drawn if, indeed, such a concept 
has value. This issue is discussed further 
in Chapter 2 when we turn to the question 
of the extent to which wealth inequality is 
a problem.
Key points
  In October 2012, the University of Birmingham launched a Policy Commission 
on the Distribution of Wealth. The Commission had three main aims: to review 
existing knowledge on wealth inequality; to question the extent to which 
wealth inequality is a problem; and to consider appropriate policy responses 
to wealth inequality. A broader aim of the Commission was to promote debate 
around the issue of wealth inequality.
  Competing ideas of wealth were at the heart of the work of this Commission 
when we set out. The balance of wealth, some argued, appeared to have 
shifted in a fundamental way, both in terms of a less even distribution of 
people who were able to share in prosperity and also in terms of a perceived 
decline of the quality or sustainability of the social, civic and natural 
environment, just as the reach of financial factors in decision-making  
was larger than ever. 
  There are many forms of wealth/capital besides those that are measured  
in traditional economic terms. One model characterises four forms of  
capital – environmental capital, human capital (including knowledge, skills  
and health), physical capital and social/organisational capital (including legal, 
political, community, family, organisation and firms). Our focus, however, is on 
personal wealth in the form of housing wealth, pension wealth and savings.
  The distribution of personal wealth is highly unequal with the overall share  
of the top tenth of the population in 2008–10 being more than 850 times the 
share of the bottom tenth. The distribution of wealth is much more unequal 
than the distribution of income. Whereas those at the (top) ninetieth percentile 
for income or earnings receive four times as much as those at the (bottom) 
tenth percentile, the ratio for wealth is 77 times.
  Wealth inequalities occur through a number of mechanisms. Some people 
have higher incomes than others and so have the opportunity to accumulate 
more wealth. Some people have similar amounts of income but choose to 
accumulate wealth rather than spend. Some people have wealthy parents and 
receive higher levels of inheritance/lifetime gifts. And some people have the 
wisdom or good luck to invest in housing and financial assets just before they 
increase substantially in value. We may wish to treat these different forms of 
wealth accumulation differently when designing policy instruments.
  There are many gaps in our knowledge about wealth inequality. Some of  
these are empirical: for example we know very little about the super rich as 
the Office for National Statistics no longer publishes data on this group using 
the estate multiplier method. And international comparative data is still rather 
limited. But there are also gaps in our theorising around wealth: What is 
wealth? How might we distinguish between groups with different levels  
of wealth? And why does it matter?
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Chapter 2
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Wealth inequality is clearly at a much higher level than income 
inequality. But does this matter? There has been remarkably little 
research on this topic and so the Commission set out a range of 
questions to help focus the gathering of evidence (see Appendix 
A). This chapter reviews a range of arguments and evidence.
The growing importance  
of personal wealth
Personal wealth, in the form of savings, 
private pensions and housing wealth has 
become increasingly important in recent 
years and will continue to be so as we 
experience the longest and deepest 
slump in a century and the social security 
system is cut.
Unemployment remains high and average 
incomes are stagnating, if not falling, while 
prices rise. Precautionary savings are 
therefore particularly important as a 
financial cushion to meet unexpected 
expenses and yet many people lack even 
a small cushion of this kind. Rowlingson 
and McKay (2013) found that one in five 
of the British population in 2013 would 
not be able to meet an unexpected 
expense of just £200 without resorting  
to borrowing.
This can mean that people turn to 
high-cost borrowing such as payday 
lenders or doorstep credit which, in turn, 
can lead to a spiral of debt. Long-term 
saving for insurance purposes, eg, 
through private pensions, is also 
increasingly important as people  
are living longer and defined benefit 
schemes are closing. And it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to become a home-
owner due to the persistence of high 
property prices relative to earnings.  
As collective forms of wealth decline, 
personal forms of wealth have become 
more important but less equally 
distributed. This has an impact  
on many areas of people’s lives.
Health and well-being
As mentioned above, wealth affects 
financial wellbeing/outlook because 
assets provide a cushion for people, a 
way to smooth income/spending and they 
may also help people look long term and 
take risks (see Khan 2010, Sherraden 
1991). But wealth also affects more 
general levels of wellbeing. For example, 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) argue that 
inequality leads to material differences 
which increase status competition and 
feelings of inferiority and superiority. Their 
focus was on income inequality but their 
theory about ‘status anxiety’ would equally 
apply to wealth inequality. Their evidence 
suggests that developed countries with 
high levels of income inequality also have 
lower life expectancy and social mobility 
alongside higher rates of infant mortality, 
murder, teenage pregnancy, obesity, 
mental health problems and so on. There 
is much discussion on the correlations 
and causal links involved here (see 
Rowlingson 2011 for a discussion) but 
the arguments about income inequality 
inequality matter?
Does wealth
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would be similarly applicable to wealth 
inequality and Nowatzki (2012) does 
indeed directly analyse the links between 
health and wealth inequality in 14 
countries (using OECD data for 2000). 
This analysis shows the strongest links 
between female life expectancy, infant 
mortality and wealth inequality. Nowatzki 
(2012) argues that consideration of 
wealth inequality may also explain some  
of the anomalies seen in previous analysis 
of income inequality and health. For 
example, Denmark has relatively low level 
of income inequality but also relatively low 
life expectancy. However, it has extremely 
high wealth inequality which might  
explain the relatively low life expectancy. 
Another possibility, however, (and one 
acknowledged by Nowatzki in the article) 
is that there may be problems with the 
measurement of wealth in Denmark. 
Another study (Kan and Laurie 2010) 
analyses the British Household Panel 
Survey to explore the relationship 
between assets and psychological 
wellbeing. They found that both men’s  
and women’s well-being (as measured  
by the GHQ12) increases when they 
themselves have savings and women’s 
well-being is also linked to whether or not 
their partner has savings (after controlling 
for other factors such as income, age, 
marital status and housing tenure). 
Well-being is also linked to whether or  
not people themselves have investments 
(though it is not linked to their partner’s 
investment status – see also Rowlingson 
and Joseph 2010). The study does not 
look at whether the amount of savings/
investment is linked with well-being but 
concentrates solely on whether or not 
people have any wealth. However, the 
study also looks at debt and finds that 
men who have debts have lower well-
being scores than those who do not,  
after controlling for other factors. 
 
McKnight and Karagiannaki (2013) 
analyse the National Child Development 
Study and find that adults who own 
wealth at the age of 23 are more likely to 
report having ‘excellent’ health at ages 33 
and 44, after controlling for other factors. 
They are also much less likely to report 
mental health problems. These effects  
of wealth on health could be due to the 
ability to afford a healthier lifestyle in  
terms of accommodation, diet, access  
to sporting activities, holidays and (in 
terms of mental health) perhaps the 
greater security of knowing that there  
will be something to fall back on if  
money is short.
 
It seems clear that those without wealth, 
in an unequal society, have lower levels  
of health and wellbeing but do those with 
high levels of wealth continue to see 
increases in their levels of happiness  
and life satisfaction as their wealth 
accumulates still further? There has been 
much discussion and research on the 
links between income and happiness 
(see, for example, Diener et al. 1993; 
Layard 2005; Kahneman and Deaton 
2010) and once again similar conclusions 
are likely to apply to wealth and 
happiness. The general consensus from 
this research is that other factors, such  
as health and social relationships are 
more important for wellbeing than money 
but income certainly makes a difference, 
particularly as income rises to bring 
people out of poverty. However, the love 
of money for its own sake is not related  
to high levels of wellbeing so the myth of 
King Midas, mentioned above, appears  
to hold true.
Economic efficiency  
and growth
As well as investigating the impact of 
inequality on social outcomes, it is also 
important to explore how inequality affects 
economic outcomes such as efficiency 
and growth. It is argued, for example, that 
entrepreneurs need economic incentives 
(i.e. the chance to accumulate higher 
incomes and assets) in order to take risks 
and start up new businesses which will 
create growth. Atkinson (1997) reviews 
the literature here and finds as many 
studies linking inequality and growth 
negatively as positively. Irvin (2008)  
also points out that there have been 
periods when the British economy has 
grown and there has been no increase in 
inequality (quite the reverse). But there 
have also been periods of growth at the 
same time as increasing inequality. So 
there is no clear link, one way or the other, 
between inequality and growth. 
There is also no agreement about whether 
performance-related pay schemes 
improve company performance or not 
(Gregg et al. 2005; 2010). Certainly, from 
2001-2011, chief executive remuneration 
quadrupled while share prices fell (High 
Pay Commission 2011), suggesting no 
direct link. In fact, there seems to be little 
evidence that top companies need to  
pay high salaries to recruit the best 
international talent. Isles (2003) found that 
86 per cent of FTSE 250 Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) came from the UK,  
and that most businesses did not recruit 
from overseas. A survey for the High  
Pay Commission (2011) also found  
that 59 per cent of CEOs in FTSE 100 
companies had been employed by the 
same company for five or more years 
before becoming the CEO and 33 per 
cent had been with the company for more 
than ten years. Another survey for the 
High Pay Commission found that 77  
per cent of CEOs were UK nationals. 
There is also little evidence that higher 
earnings provide incentives to work  
harder and therefore a more competitive 
economy. In 2001, a US CEO was  
paid 31 times an average worker. The 
equivalent ratio was 25 times in the UK, 
15 times in France, 13 in Sweden, 11  
in Germany and 10 in Japan (Ramsay, 
2005). According to the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
2010-11, Sweden comes second in the 
competitiveness league table, two places 
ahead of the US.
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Equal opportunities 
Another set of arguments around the 
impact of inequality relate to its potential 
impact on equal opportunities. McKnight 
and Karagiannaki (2013) review a  
number of (mainly US) studies which 
demonstrate a strong link between 
parental wealth and children’s educational 
attainment, independent of any income 
effect. This could reflect the fact that 
wealthier parents can afford to live in 
more expensive areas in the catchment 
areas of high-performing state schools.  
In the UK, Gibbons et al. (2012) suggest 
that a property in the catchment area of  
a school at the top of the league tables 
attracts a property price premium of 
around 12 per cent relative to one at  
the bottom. At the time of the research 
(2006), this was equivalent to £21,000.
Wealth can therefore enable parents to 
live in catchment areas of high-performing 
schools and/or it can help pay for private 
education either through private schooling 
or extra tuition/activities which enhance 
their children’s education. Larger housing 
may also provide more space for children 
to do their homework. Wealth can also 
pay for extra-curricular activities, IT 
equipment and so on.
McKnight and Karagiannaki (2013) 
analyse the British Household Panel 
Survey and the National Child 
Development Survey to assess the impact 
of wealth-holding on a range of outcomes. 
They find that parental wealth is clearly 
related to children’s educational 
attainment at degree level and above.  
This ‘asset effect’ is additional to any 
effect from parental education and 
income. Their analysis also finds that 
parental wealth has a direct effect on  
the chances of their children being in 
employment at age 25. The reverse is  
also true – the children of parents with 
low levels of wealth or, indeed, debt, are 
much less likely to be in employment at 
age 25.
Wealth held by adults can also, in  
theory, have an impact on life chances  
in adulthood as it can help adults attain 
more highly-paid, secure employment, 
either through being able to fund 
additional training/education (including  
a gap year, unpaid internship etc), spend 
longer searching for a better job, and 
move (to a more expensive) location  
to be closer to a better job. As well  
as investigating the impact of parental  
wealth on life chances, McKnight and 
Karagiannaki (2013) also measure  
the impact of owning wealth in early 
adulthood on later outcomes. For 
example, men who own wealth at age  
23 are more likely to be in employment  
at ages 33 and 42. The picture is more 
complex for women with those who have 
more moderate levels of wealth at 23 
having higher rates of employment later  
in life than either women with no/very  
low wealth or women with high levels. 
McKnight and Karagiannaki (2013) 
speculate that perhaps women with no/
very low levels are disadvantaged in terms 
of future employment whereas women 
with high levels have greater choice to 
take time out of employment when they 
have children.
If some children, and indeed some adults, 
have greater educational and employment 
opportunities due to wealth-holding, the 
question arises as to whether or not this  
is fair, both within and across different 
generations. A society might tolerate 
some difference in opportunities as the 
price of preserving family life but when the 
playing field for children is so unequal and 
life chances are strongly determined from 
birth, it becomes difficult to defend from  
a social justice perspective. Inequality 
between generations is also an issue as 
middle income ‘baby boomers’ have done 
relatively well from housing wealth and the 
current recession appears to be hitting 
younger generations more. But politicians 
appear, so far at least, to be protecting 
older people from the impact of austerity. 
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Social cohesion, democracy, 
freedom and dignity
The impact of wealth inequality on society 
and politics more generally is difficult to 
pin down as accurately as the impact  
on individuals. But it has been argued 
(Giddens 1998) that the wealthy  
become insulated from the lives of others, 
excluding themselves from society. This 
voluntary exclusion at the top mirrors the 
forced social exclusion at the bottom of 
society and so may harm social cohesion. 
The socio-economic distance of the  
top from the rest of society may take a 
particularly damaging form in relation to 
the political process. In the US, concerns 
have arisen at the extent to which the 
wealthy can buy political power through 
using their wealth to mount political 
campaigns for themselves (eg, Ross 
Perot, Mitt Romney, Steve Forbes) or  
to support other campaigns with the 
likelihood that substantial financial support 
will lead to political influence (Hacker and 
Pierson (2010). This has not been 
considered such an issue in the UK to 
date but, since 2010, attention has been 
paid to the number of millionaires in the 
cabinet (23 out of 29 according to The 
Daily Mail in May 2010). As politicians 
and policy-makers appear to be 
increasingly drawn from the ranks of  
the wealthy, this may also make for poor 
decisions and policy-making. There was 
also widespread concern expressed in 
June 2013 over a number of peers and an 
MP who agreed to do parliamentary work 
for financial reward. Such payments are 
not allowed under current rules but 
people can, legitimately, donate to 
political parties and pay for the ‘privilege’ 
of dining with members of the cabinet. 
The ability to influence policy is therefore 
likely to be linked indirectly, if not directly, 
to the ability to pay.
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The political and socio-economic power 
of the rich lies in contrast with the lack of 
freedom of those without wealth. In The 
Social Contract2, Rousseau argues that 
there should be limits to inequality to 
preserve a degree of personal freedom: 
‘No citizen should be rich enough to be 
able to buy another and none so poor that 
he has to sell himself’. Rousseau argues 
that a lack of material resources can lead 
people to the equivalent of slavery. 
Fairness and wealth 
accumulation
Wealth can be accumulated in different 
ways, for example as a result of saving 
earnings/income or through inheritance 
and lifetime gifts (earned and unearned 
wealth respectively). A third source of 
wealth is that which is accumulated 
through increases in stock market or 
house price values (also generally 
considered to be unearned wealth).  
Of course, this last form of wealth 
accumulation may be due to careful and 
clever investment decisions and may 
therefore be the result of ‘work’ in the 
form of investment management, but it 
could equally be due to pure good luck. 
While it is possible, in theory, to 
distinguish between these different 
sources of wealth it is not so easy, in 
practice, to identify them empirically. 
Where people accumulate wealth through 
hard work or a preference for saving,  
for example, resulting inequalities might 
seem fair. Where people accumulate large 
fortunes through, for example, exploitation 
or luck, the resulting inequalities are less 
likely to be considered fair. However, even 
though most would agree that hard work 
deserves higher reward, the extent of  
the rewards to certain kinds of work has 
increased substantially since the 1980s 
and is out of line with public attitudes.
As the High Pay Commission (2011) 
pointed out, the top 0.1 per cent of the 
income distribution saw their incomes 
grow by 64.2 per cent between 1996/7 
and 2007/8. Median income grew by  
only 7.2 per cent over the same period.  
It is difficult to believe that this top  
income group worked harder by a 
commensurate amount.
What is it that matters,  
and for whom? 
There are, therefore, a number of 
arguments and pieces of evidence which 
suggest that wealth inequality may be 
harmful at a social, political, economic and 
individual level (in terms of life chances). 
But it is not at all clear what type and level 
of wealth inequality is (most) harmful,  
and for whom. For example, is it relative  
or absolute differences of wealth that 
matter most? Is it the ratio of wealth to 
purchasing power (eg, ratio of wealth  
to income) that matters because it 
determines how much/what wealth can 
buy someone? Is there a particular level/
threshold of wealth inequality which is 
harmful or is there a linear relationship 
between wealth inequality and negative 
outcomes? And is it a greater problem 
that some people have no/negative wealth 
or that some have extremely high levels? 
The current extent of wealth inequality  
is considerably greater than we might 
expect from lifecycle factors and 
preference for saving rather than 
spending. Differences in income and 
inheritance levels play a major role. 
Karagiannaki and Hills (2013) estimate 
that between 16 and 28 per cent of 
personal marketable wealth is the result of 
inheritance. Lifetime gifts are worth about 
a tenth of the value of inheritances and  
so account for about two to three per  
cent of overall wealth. We might consider 
some differences in income and 
inheritance to be acceptable in response 
to differences in effort, skill and family 
support. But the extent of these 
differences seems difficult to justify, 
particularly in the light of the very great 
increases in top incomes since the 1980s 
(mentioned above) and the very large 
inheritances received by those at  
the top.
This begs the question, of course, of 
where the ‘top’ is. The super rich have 
variously been defined as the top one  
per cent, the top 0.1 per cent, and the  
top 0.05 per cent, as these groups have 
experienced a high increase in their levels 
of income and wealth in recent years.  
But is this too exclusive a group to focus 
on? The National Equality Panel (2010) 
pointed to the extremely high ratio of  
75:1 between the ninetieth and tenth 
percentiles of the wealth distribution. And 
in June 2013, Ed Balls suggested means 
testing (or perhaps ‘affluence testing’ is 
more appropriate?) winter fuel payments 
for those pensioners paying top and 
higher rates of tax. This would affect 
around five per cent of those currently 
receiving the payments. One reason why 
the definition of those at ‘the top’ matters 
is precisely in relation to policy reform. 
Which groups might be taxed more?  
And which groups might lose (universal) 
benefits if these were to become means 
tested? Income tax thresholds might  
be one way of categorising people but 
income and assets are different and asset 
thresholds might also be important to 
determine alongside income thresholds. 
It is clear (see above) that those with no 
or negative wealth (ie, net debt) are at a 
much greater disadvantage in life than 
those with moderate or high amounts of 
wealth. For example, they have no cushion 
to fall back on in times of need and 
certainly no ladder to help them climb the 
socio-economic scale. In a society with a 
2   The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Book II, Chapter XI. The Various Systems of Legislation
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liberal welfare state, lack of private wealth 
puts people at a particular disadvantage 
and this report will therefore consider 
what can be done to help those at the 
bottom of the wealth distribution. 
Finally, there are those ‘in the middle’ of 
the wealth distribution. This group, again 
variously defined, has become more 
prominent in political debate with the  
term ‘squeezed middle’ which is used 
extensively by Ed Miliband, though 
pertaining to the middle of the income 
distribution rather than the wealth 
distribution. The ‘squeezed middle’ in 
terms of assets might be a group with 
some housing and pension assets, or 
some hope of accumulating such assets 
in the future but perhaps not the  
highest levels. 
In terms of policy reform, there is a 
question about which group should 
receive most attention and support.  
Those at the bottom are the group with the 
greatest need of help. Policies designed to 
help them might not affect the overall level 
of wealth inequality much but might make 
a big difference to their lives. Those in the 
middle are the most numerous and will 
include the powerful ‘median voter’ whom 
politicians from the main parties seek to 
attract. And those at the top have the  
most power to influence policy. 
Of course, within each of these groups 
there are particular segments of the 
population of interest (including different 
age groups, genders, ethnicities and so 
on). This report does not go into detail 
about these groups but young people  
are a particular concern given that young 
people today are likely to be worse off 
compared with previous generations – the 
first time this has happened since data 
has been available on living standards.
As well as there being a need to consider 
how policy might respond to different 
groups (as we do in the next three 
chapters), there is also an over-arching 
issue about the complexities and 
contradictions of government policies 
towards assets. Hills et al. (2013: 204), 
following on from the Mirrlees review, 
argue that wealth taxation, for example,  
is an ‘illogical and inequitable mess.’ Hills 
et al. (2013) carried out a comprehensive 
and incisive review of a wide range of 
wealth-related policies and we do not 
seek to repeat many of the excellent 
points made in that book. We therefore 
concentrate, here, on the three groups of 
particular interest to the Commission and 
outline some potential areas for reform.
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Key points
  Personal wealth has become increasingly important in recent years and  
will continue to do so as we experience the longest and deepest slump in a 
century and social security benefits are cut. Unemployment remains high and 
average incomes are stagnating, if not falling, while prices rise. Precautionary 
savings are therefore particularly important as a financial cushion to meet 
unexpected expenses and yet many people lack even a small cushion of  
this kind. 
  Wealth affects health. There is strong evidence that people with wealth have 
higher levels of physical and mental well-being than those without, after 
controlling for other factors. People with debts are likely to have lower levels 
of mental well-being.
  Wealth affects education and employment opportunities. There is a strong link 
between parental wealth and children’s educational attainment, independent of 
any income effect. Young people with wealth also do better later in life (eg, in 
terms of employment).
  The impact of wealth inequality on society and politics more generally are 
difficult to pin down as accurately as the impact on individuals. But it has been 
argued that the wealthy become insulated from the lives of others, leading to 
social fractures. The ability of the wealthy to gain greater influence in the 
corridors of power is also a potential threat to democratic processes.
  Wealth and income inequalities are sometimes defended as being important  
in relation to economic growth, as the opportunity to accumulate high levels  
of income and wealth might provide incentives for entrepreneurship or high 
levels of effort and performance. But there is a lack of strong evidence  
for this.
  Wealth can be accumulated in different ways and this may relate to  
notions of fairness. Some of these (eg, through hard work and efforts to  
save from income) may be seen as more worthy than others (eg, receiving  
a large inheritance).
  Wealth clearly matters. But there is still much more thinking and empirical 
research to be done on what it is that matters, and for whom. Our report 
concentrates on three groups: those with very little, no or negative wealth; 
those in the middle with some assets; and those at the top.
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Some people in the lower deciles of the wealth distribution have very little, if any wealth. 
And some have negative wealth (higher levels of debts than assets). Part of the underlying 
explanation for this is the low level of income for many people as incomes have stagnated, 
if not fallen, in the last decade. Low incomes reduce the ability to avoid debt and/or 
accumulate saving. Ways of raising incomes, for example through a living wage policy, 
greater worker representation in companies and/or training to raise skill levels therefore 
need consideration. But this chapter focuses more particularly on wealth-related policies.
Dealing with, and preventing, 
problem debt
Some forms of negative wealth may 
not necessarily be problematic if they 
represent investments likely to lead to 
greater wealth in the future. For example, 
if a student loan enables someone to gain 
an education which leads to a higher paid 
job, then this should be seen positively. 
Similarly, if someone takes on a 100  
(or even 110) per cent mortgage at  
a time when house prices are rising 
considerably, then this could also be seen 
as an investment rather than a problem 
debt. But even in these cases, a level of 
risk is being taken (that the education will 
lead to higher pay; that the value of the 
house will rise, or that interest rates will 
not). In other cases, debt may have little 
investment potential but is acquired to 
meet particular needs that cannot be  
met through saving. And where the cost 
of any loan is high, it can indeed lead  
to debt spirals which cause further 
problems. The policy issue here is how  
to reduce and then prevent further 
accumulation of problem debt.
Levels of problem debt appear to have 
been increasing even before the full 
impact of the recession might have been 
expected. The proportion of people who 
found their unsecured credit commitments 
a heavy burden increased from 16.2 per 
cent in 2006/8 to 18 per cent in 2008/10 
(Rowlingson and McKay 2013). There is 
also evidence of an increase between 
2006 and 2008/9 in the proportion  
of households where repayments on 
unsecured borrowing were more than  
25 per cent of income (from three to eight 
per cent of households). More recently, 
evictions from rented properties have 
been increasing since 2010, to around 
10,000 claims for possession in 2013. 
Recent welfare reforms which will not  
only reduce the amount of benefit paid  
to various groups but also change the  
nature of the payment (paying all benefits 
together – including housing benefit –  
in a single lump sum once every four 
months under Universal Credit) are widely 
predicted to increase problem debt still 
further as people struggle to manage.
no or negative wealth
Those with       
   very little, 
Money advice, particularly debt advice,  
is crucial here, though it can be a very 
long-term and therefore expensive 
process to reduce debt for people  
with serious problems (Orton 2010).  
Debt advice has been funded by the 
government in recent years though the 
Financial Inclusion Fund and now the 
Money Advice Service (MAS). But one  
of the most important funding streams, 
provided by the Legal Services 
Commission (LSC) to aid consumers in 
need of labour-intensive debt help, was 
withdrawn in April 2013. This will put a 
great deal of pressure on the MAS annual 
budget for face-to-face debt advice, 
which stands at £27m for 2012 / 2013. 
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This budget funds 150,000 advice 
sessions across 16 different projects 
managed through six lead organisations, 
including Citizens Advice. The MAS’s own 
research (2012), however, estimates that 
there were 6.6 million ‘over-indebted’ 
households in the UK in 2012 that 
perceived debt as a heavy burden or  
had arrears of three months or more.  
Of these, the MAS estimates that: 
  2.1 million will actively seek  
debt advice
  2.2 million would benefit from  
debt advice
  1.0 million could benefit from broader 
money advice, and
  1.3 million are unlikely to ever seek 
debt advice.
Current levels of funding are clearly 
insufficient to meet this need. 
In terms of debt prevention, increased 
levels of saving would clearly help to  
avoid the need to borrow. Saving is clearly 
difficult for those on very low incomes  
but if people can afford to repay a loan, 
this suggests that they could afford to 
save (see below also). Credit Unions 
sometimes work on this basis, and when 
they give loans to people they include  
a small amount which is saved into a 
savings account at the same time as  
the loan is being repaid. When the loan 
comes to an end, saving is continued at 
the same level as the loan repayments  
to build up a reserve for the future (see 
Kempson and Collard 2013a). However, 
Credit Unions are still not as widely 
known about or used, leaving people to 
rely on the more heavily marketed and 
much more expensive lenders such as 
payday lenders and home collected credit. 
The government is investing £35.6m from 
2013 in an attempt to double membership 
of credit unions to two million over the 
next five years. This is helpful investment 
but will still leave credit unions a small 
player in the market at a time when use  
of payday lenders and doorstep  
credit is expanding. The Public Accounts 
Committee recently drew on National 
Audit Office research to criticise the 
Office for Fair Trading’s weakness in 
regulating payday lenders and the OFT 
referred the industry to the Competition 
Commission in June 2013. The Financial 
Conduct Authority will be taking over 
responsibility for this from April 2014  
and could consider introducing tougher 
measures such as an interest rate cap, 
disclosure of information on default rates, 
a ban (or restrictions) on advertising and 
stronger enforcement/penalties.
As mentioned above, another cause of 
problem debt is difficulty managing on a 
low income. This looks likely to increase 
with the introduction of Universal Credit 
which will pay people their benefits 
(including Housing Benefit) in one lump 
sum, monthly in arrears. Such payments 
will no doubt cause budgeting difficulties, 
particularly for people without bank 
accounts. And while the number of people 
who are ‘unbanked’ has fallen, this is  
still an issue, as is access to appropriate 
banking products. Some bank accounts 
charge high fees for bounced payments 
or unauthorised overdrafts, effectively 
providing more expensive credit than 
payday lenders. Some financial products, 
however, can help people manage their 
money better. ‘Jam jar accounts’ are a 
relatively new development, designed  
for people on very low incomes (Social 
Market Finance 2011). They enable 
people to split their account balance  
into different categories (jam jars) for 
spending, saving and bill payment.  
There is provision for ‘low balance alerts’, 
pre-paid cards, use of standing orders/
direct debits, and automatic transfer of 
funds between jam jars. These accounts 
exist at the moment but charge a fixed 
monthly fee. This fee could be reduced if 
taken up at scale, or subsidised. Citysave 
in Birmingham have recently introduced 
one at a fee of 50p per week for the  
basic account.
Alongside jam jar accounts, new 
technology could be utilised, particularly 
for younger people perhaps, for example 
in the form of ‘mobile wallets/purses’ 
(Kempson and Collard 2013b). O2 has 
developed a mobile wallet which enables 
people to receive electronic payments 
(including social security payments) into  
a stored value account; access these 
funds using a virtual Visa card for online 
transactions and a linked physical Visa 
card; set up standing orders; and transfer 
money to family/friends. One advantage  
of this account is that it is not possible  
to get overdrawn. But there are up-front 
fees for loading money into the account 
and for the physical Visa card and for 
money transfers. So while those with  
the greatest resources enjoy free banking, 
those with least are charged. And it  
would be essential to ensure that  
any new, innovative products are 
effectively regulated.
Promoting savings
Another means of avoiding problem debt 
is to accumulate savings. The Saving 
Gateway was a flagship matched-savings 
scheme designed to encourage/reward 
people on low incomes to save but it  
was scrapped by the incoming Coalition 
government in 2010 on grounds of cost. 
A number of new policy ideas have  
been proposed in its place, not least  
the suggestion from the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR) for a  
‘New Lifecourse’ savings account to  
help people save through easy access 
to the account to make deposits  
and withdrawals (possibly through 
supermarkets) (Dolphin 2011). Two 
specific products would be included in 
the account: a Lifetime Bonus Savings 
Account, aimed at encouraging saving, 
particularly to help families cope with 
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emergencies, and a ‘Long-term 
Investment’ account. The IPPR argued 
that the government should pay a  
bonus into accounts on a sliding scale, 
dependent on the average balance held  
in the account over the preceding three 
years. Only four withdrawals a year would 
be allowed before this bonus is lost,  
in order to encourage people to retain 
savings in the account. Savings in this 
account should be exempt from asset 
testing for welfare benefits, including 
Universal Credit. This could mean placing 
a cap on the size of the account, perhaps 
at £10,000. Funding for the scheme 
could come from replacing the cash 
Individual Savings Account (ISA) scheme. 
This is likely to be unpopular with those 
on middle and high incomes, and older 
people, but would re-balance the current 
incentives to save, which largely miss 
those on the lowest incomes.
Another option with this, or similar saving 
scheme, would be to introduce auto-
enrolment. For example, when people join 
an employer, as well as being enrolled 
into NEST (the National Employment 
Savings Trust pension scheme), or 
another form of occupational pension, 
they could also be enrolled into a savings 
scheme. Dolphin (2011) argued that his 
research with young people suggested 
that they did not want such auto 
enrolment for savings accounts. They 
were willing to have an account opened 
for them but not for an automatic amount 
of money to be set aside from their pay. 
But perhaps even the opening of an 
account might trigger people to make 
some savings, particularly if there was  
a bonus payment to be paid.
If people on low incomes are encouraged 
to save then it will be vital to review  
the existence of means tests for social 
security benefits which include financial 
assets. Housing assets are not taken  
into account for means testing except  
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in relation to social care and there have 
been recent changes to reduce the 
thresholds here. The issue of means  
tests on savings for benefits is actually 
becoming more problematic under 
Universal Credit as there are no capital 
limits at the moment with working people 
claiming tax credits but these will be, 
effectively, under Universal Credit.
Other ways of encouraging people to 
save include innovative products from the 
private sector such as Lloyds TSB’s ‘Save 
the Change’ facility. This is designed to 
overcome inertia around saving because 
every time someone uses their debit card 
the amount spent is rounded up and the 
difference is transferred to a savings 
account. Savings accounts could be  
(and many are) designed to make access 
more difficult though not impossible (eg, 
48 hour notice, withdrawals made in 
person). This reduces the chance that 
savings will be drawn on too easily. 
Accounts could also be specifically 
geared towards saving for a particular 
purpose, eg, ‘car accounts’ with 
incentives such as offer of free breakdown 
cover. And other incentives might be 
product tie-ins/discount vouchers, 
prize-based savings accounts etc. 
Last, but not least, there would be great 
merit in the suggestion that a not-for-
profit organisation be established to 
represent the interests of savers. A 
portion of the fees that savers pay to  
the financial services industry already  
fund trade bodies and regulators. If some 
of these fees could be directed to an 
organisation to represent savers it might 
be able to challenge some of the long-
standing market imperfections in the 
industry, not least the high fees and low 
levels of service which seem unlikely to 
represent genuine competitive market 
clearing levels (see Myners 2001 and 
Sandler 2001).
Credit Unions could play a key role  
here, as advocated by Justin Wellby,  
the Archbishop of Canterbury in a speech 
in December 20123. Credit Unions can 
provide debt advice, low-cost loans, saving 
3   http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5005/bishop-justin-welby-speaks-on-credit-unions-in-house-of-lords
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Key points
  Levels of low income are a concern as they reduce the ability to avoid debt 
and/or accumulate saving. Ways of raising incomes, for example through  
a living wage policy, greater worker representation in companies, and/or 
training to raise skill levels need consideration.
  Levels of problem debt have been increasing in recent years and look set to 
increase still further with the introduction of welfare reforms which will both 
reduce the amount of benefit received by various groups and also change 
the ways in which people receive it. The impact of benefit reform needs 
careful scrutiny.
  Debt advice is crucial here but there has been a reduction in funding for 
some forms of debt advice (eg, through Law Centres). Continued, and indeed 
increasing, support for debt advice is essential to support people, particularly 
through these difficult economic times.
  Credit Unions are, potentially, an ideal vehicle for supporting people in terms 
of: money advice; affordable credit; transactional banking services; and 
savings schemes. Credit Unions are receiving government investment but 
they need much higher levels, not least because of the low level of interest 
they (are constrained to) charge.
  The financial services sector also needs to play its part here. Payday lending 
is currently under the scrutiny of the Competition Commission; and the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has warned the banks  
to improve the services they provide to people on low incomes. The 
development of new technologies (mobile banking etc) could also be  
used to help people manage and save their money.
  People on low incomes receive much less support for saving than those  
on middle and high incomes. For example, those who are below the income 
tax thresholds do not benefit from tax-free savings products like ISAs. And 
higher rate tax payers benefit more than standard rate tax payers. The Saving 
Gateway was a policy designed to provide incentives/rewards to those on 
low incomes who nevertheless managed to save by providing a match (50p 
for every pound saved up to a threshold). Further thought needs to be given 
to how such a scheme can be funded.
  Other ways of encouraging saving should also be developed including, 
auto-enrolment into savings accounts when people start a new job and ‘save 
the change’ savings accounts linked to credit and debit cards. Means tests 
on savings for workers receiving Universal Credit should also be reviewed  
as a possible disincentive to save for such groups.
  There is currently no organisation which solely represents the interests of 
savers and this is something which could be established, for example, using 
the fees which savers pay to the financial services industry and which are 
currently used to fund trade bodies and regulators.
schemes and transactional bank accounts 
on a not-for-profit basis. They have 
received considerable government funding 
under the Modernisation Programme, but 
this is still insufficient given that they are 
effectively competing with private sector 
organisations which can charge interest 
rates around 5,000 per cent. From April 
2014, the interest rate ceiling on credit 
union loans will rise from two per cent to 
three per cent a month. Three per cent a 
month works out at an APR of 42.6 per 
cent. Credit Unions would not want to 
charge high rates of interest but, in lending 
at such low relative APRs to people with 
high default rates, it is difficult for them  
to be sustainable without significantly  
more support.
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Those in the middle of the wealth distribution tend have some 
housing and pension wealth or the ability to accumulate some. 
But there are a number of issues facing these groups, not least 
the ability of younger people to get a foot on the housing ladder 
and the ability to access some of their wealth to maintain or 
increase their living standards, particularly in retirement.
Housing wealth
We discuss housing wealth in this section 
of the report but recognise that owner-
occupation is widespread in the UK and 
that many people on very low incomes 
may be owner-occupiers. 
However, since the credit crunch, it has 
become much more difficult for people  
on low and even middle incomes to get  
a foot on the housing ladder. This is due 
to a combination of rising house prices 
relative to average earnings (and in 
particular the earnings of first-time buyers) 
but also difficulty accessing mortgage 
funding as lenders require larger deposits 
(which take much longer to save given 
earnings stagnation), higher arrangement 
fees and lower price to earnings ratios for 
lending. The government’s ‘Funding for 
Lending Scheme’ does, more recently, 
appear to have helped here with mortgage 
lending increasing in 2012/2013 (though 
finance to small and medium-sized 
enterprises still an issue). However, there 
is considerable ‘lock-in’ to traditional 
methods of housing finance, and in this 
context government support for lending 
effectively props up the relatively high 
house prices which are also part of the 
problem. Prices, ideally, need to come 
down, not least by increasing supply.  
But those with housing wealth may not  
be enthusiastic about such policies.
Many younger people are, therefore, 
increasingly relying on the ‘Bank of  
Mum and Dad’ and the private sector  
is responding to this with a number of 
innovative schemes (see Smith et al. 
2013). For example, Barclays has 
introduced a ‘Springboard’ mortgage 
which allows borrowers to get a mortgage 
on only a five per cent deposit. A family 
member, however, would have to put up a 
further ten per cent of the purchase price 
into a ‘Helpful Start’ savings account. 
Provided all the payments are up-to-date, 
the family savings will be returned after 
three years along with any interest earned. 
Barclays also offer the ‘family affordability 
plan’ under which the income of both the 
property-buyer and their parents count 
towards the calculation used to determine 
how much they will lend. All parties are 
then liable for the monthly payments 
although the parents do not need to  
be named on the deeds, which means 
they can be easily be removed by 
remortgaging later down the line with no 
equity to transfer. Lloyds have a ‘Lend a 
Hand’ three-year mortgage which requires 
a 20 per cent deposit placed into a linked 
savings account which is higher than  
the ‘Springboard’ mortgage but the 
repayment rate is lower and if parents 
agree to using spare equity in their  
home as additional security, the National 
Counties Family First mortgage has  
a relatively low rate of repayments.
with some assets
Those
‘in the middle’
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There are also government schemes such 
as the ‘FirstBuy’ shared equity scheme 
with borrowers only needing five per cent 
deposit (with the government and the 
developer putting up 20 per cent so only 
a 75 per cent mortgage is needed) and 
‘NewBuy’ where only a 5 per cent deposit 
is needed and the loan is backed by a 
special indemnity fund if the homebuyer 
cannot pay the mortgage. The ‘Help-to-
Buy’ scheme caused controversy in 2013 
when George Osborne announced that 
first-time-buyers could get a mortgage  
on a 5 per cent deposit with government 
guaranteeing 15 per cent. But critics 
suggested that people could use this to 
buy second homes and so the support 
would not be going to the right people 
and the costs could be very high. The 
Treasury Select Committee has now 
analysed the main measures and said it is 
not clear what fee lenders will have to pay 
to take part in the scheme or how it will be 
structured to cover potential losses. The 
Committee suggest that the Treasury will 
find it difficult to price the scheme in a 
way which ‘sharply curtails risk’ to the 
taxpayer. So the Treasury could potentially 
face big losses on loans it has guaranteed 
if lenders start to act more aggressively 
and the number of repossessions rise.
Housing wealth is accumulated for a 
number of reasons and many people  
say, in surveys, that they are saving for 
retirement in their property rather than in  
a pension. The Pensions Policy Institute 
(2009) reviewed the role of housing 
wealth in retirement and made the 
following key points:
  the main way that housing wealth 
supports retirement is by reducing 
living costs for most home owners.
  down-sizing, by moving to a cheaper 
property is more popular than using  
an equity release product.
  very few people currently take out 
equity release products – around 1 per 
cent of the net housing wealth held by 
UK pensioner households is released 
through such products.
However, home ownership is increasing 
among the retired population so there may 
be greater scope for equity release 
products. But those with the highest 
levels of housing wealth also have the 
highest levels of pension wealth and 
those with the lowest levels of housing 
wealth have too little to be of much help. 
There are also issues about the interaction 
with the benefit system as housing wealth 
does not affect entitlement to means-
tested benefits but both cash savings and 
income do. There are a number of other 
barriers to using equity release such as 
attachment to home, the desire to leave  
a bequest, a lack of mainstream financial 
providers in the market etc.
Oxford Economics (2012) estimate that 
over one million people could be lifted out 
of poverty each year from 2012 to 2014 if 
they released equity. This estimate is 
based on some of the following figures:
  1.7 million pensioners in 2010/11 had 
disposable income below 60 per cent 
median household income and 0.8 
million were considered ‘materially 
deprived’.
  In 2011, 16,095 pensioner households 
took out equity release products.
  Survey data on equity release 
customers’ other income suggests up 
to 60% are below the relative poverty 
threshold.
  Customers could select a ‘draw-down’ 
product offering £5,000 each year for 
12 years and this could potentially 
raise between 3.8 million and 22.8 
million pensioners out of poverty each 
year from 2012 to 2040.
JustRetirement (2012) have called on the 
government to establish an industry-wide 
group to examine how markets for 
housing equity withdrawal could be 
encouraged to function more effectively. 
They point out that ‘modern’ equity 
release products are more flexible – like 
turning on a tap. They also argue for 
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raising awareness of such schemes 
through public education as well as  
the provision of high-quality, trusted, 
independent professional advice. Local 
authorities could also be involved in this, 
given their role in relation to long-term 
care. Clarity around government policy on 
long-term care would also be beneficial 
so that people can plan ahead, financially, 
with greater confidence about how the 
system will work in the future. 
One innovative idea in relation to housing 
wealth more generally is to consider the 
options for complementing traditional debt 
funding in housing markets with equity 
finance (Smith et al. 2013). This offers the 
option to design products that effectively 
separate the cost of housing services/
consumption from housing wealth/equity 
thus potentially reducing the cost of home 
purchase (for those willing to sacrifice 
some proportion of the investment return) 
and enabling renters (and others) who are 
not owner-occupiers to hold some part of 
their wealth portfolio in vehicles whose 
returns are linked to house prices (rather 
than, for example, interest rates). Such 
schemes enable home occupiers to  
share housing investment risks with other 
individuals, lenders, investors, landlords, 
builders and government. A range of 
innovative products, from shared equity  
to house-price-linked savings accounts 
could be developed but would need 
regulation, and, ideally, partnership 
between government, the third sector and 
the private sector. Such products could, 
helpfully, allow for ‘stair-casing down’ 
from whole home ownership as well as 
‘stair-casing up’. More fruitfully still, they 
could widen the housing options available 
for those who prefer the more balanced 
wealth portfolio that is enabled by a 
housing system no longer centred on  
the stark tenure divide between whole 
ownership and no ownership. 
Pensions
Pensions are vital to provide decent 
incomes in later life. In recent decades, 
successive governments have sought  
to encourage private pension provision 
rather than reliance on state pensions  
but this strategy has not, so far, proved 
successful for a number of reasons and 
inequalities in private pension provision 
are significant. Following on from the 
previous Conservative administrations, 
New Labour put its faith in the market to 
provide a greater proportion of retirement 
income for pensioners in the future (DSS 
1998). But it soon became clear that 
employers were moving away from 
generous pension packages. This 
reflected changes in the legislation 
affecting defined benefit schemes, their 
tax treatment, and the ending of a positive 
stock market run. All of these contributed 
to leaving many pension funds with large 
funding deficits. Increasing longevity  
also placed a strain on pension funds  
and the government decided to re-think 
its strategy with the help of an 
independent Pensions Commission, 
largely in order to build a consensus 
around pensions policy.
The Pensions Commission (2004; 2005; 
2006) recommended a rise in the age at 
which people could first receive state 
pensions, alongside a renewed role for 
insurance-based state pensions (through 
restoring the link between increases in  
the state retirement pension and earnings) 
and more support for private saving (not 
least through the introduction of auto 
enrolment and NEST – see below). These 
proposals were received very positively 
across the political and public spectrum 
though it is significant that the government 
of the day stated that restoring the link 
between the state retirement pension  
and earnings would be ‘subject to 
affordability’. Despite the recession, the 
Coalition (2010) agreement accepted the 
broad thrust of the Pensions Commission 
recommendations, including restoring the 
earnings link for the basic state pension 
from April 2011 with a ‘triple guarantee’ 
that state pensions would rise by 
whichever was the greatest of earnings, 
prices or 2.5 per cent. However, it would 
take many years to make much difference 
to the pockets of pensioners.
In the meantime, the decline of Defined 
Benefit pension schemes in favour of 
Defined Contribution (DC) schemes has 
continued apace and savers with DC 
schemes have little idea of how much 
money they will receive in retirement. The 
risk of retiring with an insufficient income 
falls solely, with these schemes, on the 
employee. For this, and many other 
reasons, private pension saving has  
not expanded despite government 
encouragement over the past few 
decades and is insufficient to provide 
most people with a reasonable level  
of income in retirement. 
However, recent reforms following  
on from the Pensions Commission 
recommendations aim to change this. For 
example, the government’s recent White 
Paper and draft Pensions Bill plans to 
introduce a single-tier pension – of £144 
a week at today’s prices – paid to every 
qualifying new pensioner with 35 years  
of NI contributions from April 2016 at the 
earliest. Those who qualify for the existing 
state pension receive payments once in 
their 60s. The age is being equalised for 
men and women, 66 for both sexes by 
2020, then 67 by 2028. The most a 
person currently receives in state pension 
is £107.45 a week. Some also receive the 
State Second Pension (SSPS), or Serps, 
an earnings-related additional pension, 
and Pension Credit tops up income to 
£142.70 for those below this threshold. 
The aim of the single-tier pension is to 
make the system simpler by getting rid of 
all means-tested benefits for pensioners. 
This will make it much easier for people  
to assess their overall retirement situation. 
By combining a known state pension and 
a separate private pension forecast 
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people can more easily read across their 
different pension entitlements to assist 
them in making decisions about how 
much to save through private pensions  
ie, on top of the state pension, for their 
retirement years. This is perhaps the 
single greatest benefit of simplification  
of the state pension. However, there  
are a number of potential winners and 
losers from this reform which requires 
further evaluation. 
Another key reform of pensions is auto 
enrolment which has been introduced (in 
stages) from October 2012 for employees 
between age 22 and State Pension age, 
earning above £9,440 after April 2013. 
By April 2017, all such employees will, 
when they join a new employer, be 
automatically enrolled into a scheme, 
meeting minimum standards set by the 
government, with the right to opt out. The 
idea is that inertia will act to keep people 
in the scheme and thus increase private 
pension saving. The required level of 
contributions that employers and 
employees must make into a pension 
scheme (if employees remain opted in) is 
being phased in between 2012 and 2018 
to reach eight per cent minimum total 
contributions. This eight per cent will be 
made up of a minimum three per cent 
from the employer and the remainder  
from the employee and the government 
(through tax relief).
The scale of workplace pension auto 
enrolment currently underway has no 
precedent. The millionth worker was auto 
enrolled into a workplace pension in July 
2013 (Wood et al. 2013). About 300,000 
employees are currently auto enrolling 
every month and about nine million British 
jobholders will eventually be enrolled. 
Auto enrolment commenced in October 
2012 with the UK’s largest employers. 
The opt-out rate is a key measure to 
determine how auto enrolment is 
performing against the policy objective  
of increasing participation in workplace 
pension schemes. The results of a  
study for the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) on 50 large employers 
between October 2012 and June 2013 
are reported below (see Wood et al. 
2013). 
Expectations before auto enrolment  
were that 30 per cent of workers would 
opt out. For 42 employers representing  
a combined total workforce of 1.9 million 
employees, 61 per cent of employees 
already participated in a pension scheme 
before auto enrolment came into force. 
Twenty four per cent of the total 
workforce was made up of jobholders 
who were auto enrolled in the first month 
of auto enrolment. The remaining 15 per 
cent in the ‘other’ category include  
groups such as non-eligible jobholders, 
individuals who were nominally on the 
payroll but not currently working, and 
other workers who could not be 
categorised by the employer when 
providing the data. The overall opt out rate 
was nine per cent in the first month after 
auto enrolment began. Auto enrolment 
has therefore increased pension scheme 
participation rates in these organisations 
from 61 per cent to 83 per cent.
 
Source: Wood et al. (2013)
Figure 1: Impact of auto enrolment on pension 
participation rate in 42 large employers
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Six employers provided age-specific 
opt-out data. The major impact on opt-out 
rates was age. Opt out rates were eight 
per cent among staff under 30 years,  
nine per cent among those aged 30 to  
49 years, and 15 per cent among those 
aged 50+. Other potential influences,  
for example the level of employer 
contributions, gender of employees, 
full-time or part-time hours, and salaries, 
did not have a significant impact on 
opt-out in these organisations. 
Early indications are therefore very 
positive about the low level of opting out 
but there are concerns about a capacity-
crunch as smaller employers begin auto 
enrolment. The resources of the new 
National Employment Savings Trust 
(NEST) will be tested in supporting and 
guiding the smaller employers through  
the auto enrolment process because 
commercial providers will not regard them 
as an attractive business proposition.
The government is also likely to face a 
challenge convincing people to increase 
their level of contribution. There is already 
some limited evidence that opt-out rates 
are influenced by the level of employee 
contributions. If contributions levels rise 
over the coming decade the proportion  
of jobholders ceasing active membership 
may also rise.
Another policy proposal being debated  
at the moment is for the development of 
‘Defined Ambition’ schemes. The aim of 
these would be to reduce the financial 
risks currently faced by employers (with 
Defined Benefit schemes) but not place 
all the risk on employees (as is the case 
with Defined Contribution schemes). 
Defined Ambition Schemes could spread 
risk between saver, employer (and 
potentially state) to make such saving 
more attractive to employees and less 
risky to employers. The current Minister  
of State for Pensions, Steve Webb,  
has revived debate here, with a focus  
on consumer attitudes. He has been 
insistent that automatic enrolment 
requires innovative products to meet  
an untapped desire for greater certainty  
in individual outcomes. For example, one 
end of the spectrum could be providing 
an affordable ‘Money Safe’ guarantee 
where the member would get back  
at least the nominal value of their 
contributions – individual, employer  
and tax relief. Another could be offering  
an investment strategy that reduces the 
probability of capital loss such as NEST. 
An extra standard could be to ensure that 
any pension scheme member when they 
check their annual benefit statement will 
always see a number higher than the 
number seen the previous year. 
The industry response has been mixed.  
In October 2012 the Investment Products 
for Retirement Savings Working Party 
published ‘Is there a place in the UK 
Defined Contribution pensions market  
for a guaranteed savings product?’. 
Conclusions to the question posed in the 
paper’s title are that yes, there probably 
could be, but there are many challenges 
as to how the guarantee would be 
provided and who would be the guarantor. 
Defined Ambition remains a loose overall 
concept but in propositional terms has 
strong intuitive appeal. Reducing some  
of the investment risk associated with DC 
should give more confidence to members 
and employers that their contributions will 
deliver the intended result. This could 
result in a number of benefits including 
increased member contributions and 
persistency, higher participation rates,  
and greater trust in financial services.
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Key points
  Those ‘in the middle’ of the wealth distribution tend  
have some housing and pension wealth or the ability  
to accumulate some. But there are a number of issues 
facing these groups, not least the difficulties people face 
in getting a foot on the housing ladder and the ability of 
owner-occupiers to access some of their housing wealth 
to maintain or increase their living standards, particularly 
in retirement.
  Since the credit crunch it has become much more 
difficult for people to get a foot on the housing ladder. 
The government’s ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ does, 
more recently, appear to have helped here with mortgage 
lending increasing in 2012/2013 (though finance to small 
and medium-sized enterprises is still an issue). However, 
government support for lending props up the relatively 
high house prices which are also part of the problem. 
Prices, ideally, need to come down, not least by 
increasing supply. But those with housing wealth  
may not be enthusiastic about such policies.
  Younger people are increasingly relying on the ‘Bank  
of Mum and Dad’ but this reinforces inequalities based 
on whether or not young people have been born into  
wealthy families.
  One interesting idea to consider here is to separate  
– for all forms of accommodation – the cost of housing 
services from the returns on residential property 
investment, potentially removing some affordability 
barriers from owner-occupation while enabling renters  
to benefit from house price appreciation (much as they 
benefit from savings linked to interest rates) if they  
wish. This paves the way for housing policy to focus  
on providing people with secure and affordable homes  
of a high standard rather than promoting particular 
tenure types.
  For those who have accumulated housing wealth, often 
as the centrepiece of their wealth portfolio, ways of 
helping them access their equity safely (without adding 
to unsustainable debts) and cost-effectively (especially in 
older age) should also be explored. In particular, there is 
interest in equity release among consumers and the 
financial services industry but very few people actually 
take advantage of such mechanisms, possibly due to the 
costs and risks involved in such products (on both sides). 
Some ways to share the risks, perhaps involving 
government, might be helpful here.
  Pensions are vital to provide decent incomes in later  
life. In recent decades, governments have sought to 
encourage private pension provision rather than reliance 
on state pensions but this strategy has not, so far, proved 
successful for a number of reasons and inequalities  
in private pension provision are significant.
  Auto enrolment appears to be working well in terms of 
low opt-out rates and this policy, alongside the single-tier 
pension, has the potential to increase living standards in 
retirement as the population ages. But small businesses 
are likely to need more support as the policy is rolled out 
among them and savers will need to save more than the 
default rate in order to reach the kind of income levels in 
retirement that most people aspire to. 
  The decline of Defined Benefit pension schemes in 
favour of Defined Contribution schemes is a particular 
concern here as savers have little idea of how much 
money they will receive in retirement. Development of 
Defined Ambition schemes, which share the risk between 
saver, employer (and potentially state) could help here 
but there have been few concrete developments and 
employers and the pensions industry appear lukewarm 
about the idea.
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As discussed above, there is no agreement about where the 
‘top’ of the wealth distribution lies but this chapter nevertheless 
discusses different policy issues in relation to those with the 
highest levels of wealth.
High incomes
This Commission is focusing on 
wealth but a key way in which wealth 
is accumulated is through saving from 
earned income.
Over the last 30 years income inequality 
has grown dramatically and those at the 
very top of the income distribution have 
seen huge increases in their incomes 
which have subsequently fed through  
into wealth inequalities. The dramatic 
increase in very high incomes in the 
1980s onwards is likely to be a key factor 
explaining wealth inequalities. A very small 
group of earners at the top were able to 
accumulate particularly high levels of 
wealth. In the 1970s, those in the top one 
percentile received six per cent of total 
income but by the end of the 2000s this 
had increased to 15 per cent (Bell and 
van Reenen 2013). And figures released 
in June 2013 by HMRC suggest that 
18,000 people now earn at least £1m per 
year – the highest number ever recorded. 
This compares with 10,000 in 2010/11 
and ‘only’ 4,000 in 1999/2000 (Boffey 
2013). These increases have occurred 
whilst average earnings have decreased 
and those in higher social classes are also 
much more likely to receive an inheritance 
and/or lifetime gift and much more likely  
to receive one of high value.
This issue has received some attention  
in recent years not least with the Hutton 
Review of Fair Pay in the Public Sector  
in 2009/10, the High Pay Commission 
(2011) and, in 2013, the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards 
(2013: 9) which argued, in relation  
to high pay in the financial services  
sector, that: 
  Many bank staff have been paid too 
much for doing the wrong things,  
with bonuses awarded and paid before 
the long-term consequences become 
apparent. The potential rewards for 
fleeting short-term success have  
sometimes been huge, but the 
penalties for failure, often manifest  
only later, have been much smaller  
or negligible. 
The Commission proposed ‘a radical 
re-shaping of remuneration’ in the finance 
sector. The UK is also giving shareholders 
a binding say on pay policy and the 
powers to consider the differentials 
between the lowest and medium paid 
workers but greater transparency and 
power for shareholders is vital to ensuring 
fairer rewards for work.
Alongside changes in remuneration policy, 
practice and regulation, high incomes 
could be taxed at a higher rate and the 
Labour government did, indeed, introduce 
an income tax rate of 50 per cent for 
income over £150,000. This has 
subsequently been reduced to 45 per 
cent by the Coalition government. Also,  
in 2009, the government announced that 
employers would be subject to 50 per 
cent tax rate on bonuses paid to bankers 
in excess of £25,000 in 2009/10.  
Those
‘at the top’
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The Treasury expected to raise £550m 
but in fact raised £2.3bn. Bell and van 
Reenen (2013) argue that this might be 
because firms accepted this as a one-off 
tax. If it were permanent they might pay 
people in different ways to avoid the tax.
Bell and van Reenen (2012) call for a 
higher marginal rate of income tax for  
high earners rather than bonus tax etc.  
but bonuses have become much more 
important to high earners in recent years. 
Their study found that for those outside 
the top decile, bonuses account for  
only 2.9 per cent of total pay whereas 83 
per cent of workers in the top percentile 
received a bonus and 35 per cent of total 
pay for these workers came in the form of 
bonuses. Top percentile workers in the 
financial sector received 44 per cent of 
their total pay in bonuses in 2008. And 
from 2002 to 2008, ‘the entire gain to the 
top percentile was a result of increased 
bonus payments. Indeed, salaries for  
this group grew at a slower rate than  
for workers in the rest of the wage 
distribution’ (page 11). There are various 
options to deal with this including a tax on 
bank profits but also a tax on the pool of 
money used to pay bankers’ bonuses. 
Switzerland has introduced a bonus limit 
of 1:1 relative to salary which can rise to 
2:1 with explicit shareholder approval. 
And shareholders in Switzerland now 
have a binding say on executive pay,  
not just pay policy as has been  
introduced in the UK recently.
Wealth taxes: an overview
Given high levels of wealth inequality, one 
option would be to reform wealth taxes  
to help redistribute wealth (see Mirrlees  
et al. 2011 and Lawton and Reed 2013). 
Sandford (2000) identifies the three 
possible forms that a wealth (or capital) 
tax can take. There are taxes relating to 
the holding of capital or wealth (as in an 
annual wealth tax, or periodic net worth/
net wealth tax as a capital levy); and/or 
taxes on the transfer of capital or wealth 
(as in taxes on death, or taxes on gifts); 
and/or taxes on the appreciation of capital 
or wealth (as in a capital gains tax, or 
CGT). Taxes on wealth have never been 
as popular or widespread as taxes on 
income and expenditure (which account 
for the vast majority of tax revenue for 
most countries). Wealth taxes, where they 
do exist, account for relatively small 
amounts of total tax revenue. 
For example, in the OECD (whose 34 
members are among the richest countries 
in the world) the combined tax revenue 
derived by member countries from annual 
wealth taxes and wealth transfer taxes 
accounts, on average, for less than one 
per cent of their total tax revenue (Evans 
2013). It is difficult to measure the 
contribution that the third form of wealth 
tax – the CGT – makes to total tax 
revenue as its revenue is generally 
included in the income tax collections 
rather than as a separate category.  
But in the UK revenue from CGT also 
historically rarely exceeds one per cent  
of government receipts (according to the 
budget 2013 forecast it will be 0.8 per 
cent in 2013/14, albeit rising from an 
even lower 0.6 per cent in predictions for 
2012/13). Most developed countries now 
have forms of CGT (New Zealand is the 
notable exception in OECD countries) 
and CGT has also been – after VAT  
– the tax most likely to be introduced in 
developing and transitional countries in 
the last 30 years or so. But the other two 
forms of wealth tax (wealth holding taxes 
and wealth transfer taxes) are not as 
prevalent as might have been expected. 
Indeed, taxes on the holding of wealth 
(such as annual wealth taxes on 
individuals) have steadily declined in 
recent decades. In 1990 exactly half of 
the OECD countries had such taxes. By 
2000 the proportion was just over one 
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third. And by 2010 such taxes only 
existed, on an ongoing basis, in France, 
Norway and Switzerland (at the cantonal 
level) (Evans 2013). 
The global financial crisis has caused 
some countries to re-introduce annual 
wealth taxes on individuals, on a 
temporary basis in some cases. Iceland, 
which had abolished the tax in 2006, 
reintroduced a wealth tax for a finite 
period in 2010. Spain also temporarily 
restored its net wealth tax in September 
2011, having abandoned it in 2008.  
Most recently, and highly controversially, 
Cyprus had to introduce a capital levy  
(a distinctive form of tax on the holding  
of one aspect of wealth, in this case bank 
savings) as part of its Eurozone bail-out 
arrangements in 2013. But these 
examples are exceptions to the more 
general trend of the decline of wealth 
taxes on the holding of wealth.
In contrast to wealth holding taxes,  
the decline in the number of developed 
countries with wealth transfer taxes  
(such as death and gift taxes) has been 
relatively small in recent decades. There 
has also been something of a shift away 
from estate-type death duties (where  
the tax is levied on the estate of the 
deceased, as in the UK and US) to 
inheritance-type taxes (where the tax is 
levied on the beneficiaries – possibly  
at varying rates depending upon the 
relationship to the deceased – as in  
all other OECD countries with wealth 
transfer taxes). All OECD countries had 
wealth transfer taxes in the 1960s. By 
1999 21 of the 24 member countries had 
them; and in 2010 23 out of 30 OECD 
countries used wealth transfer taxes.
There are two main problems when 
looking to use wealth taxes: disclosure 
and valuation. The problem of disclosure 
is obvious: it is easy to hide many forms  
of holding wealth (bank accounts held 
outside of the country, money invested  
in art which is moveable at will, and so  
on). Compliance therefore becomes a 
significant problem as greater use of such 
taxes is made. Hence inequities begin  
to arise between honest and dishonest 
taxpayers; and revenue authorities 
introduce compromises (such as 
exempting household articles) which 
inevitably undermine the efficiency, equity 
and integrity of the tax. Valuation is also  
a major problem, especially where no sale 
of the asset takes place and the real value 
of the form in which wealth is held cannot 
be assessed. (Not all forms of holding 
wealth have markets that reveal their price 
on a current or regular basis – eg, works 
of art, jewellery, even houses – so valuation 
on a regular basis is a significant problem 
when a tax due computation needs to rely 
on this value being objectively agreed 
rather than just approximated. Without 
this, addressing challenges to valuations 
will produce significant inefficiencies in 
the application of such a tax). 
However, there are very powerful 
arguments in favour of wealth taxes, 
whether on the holding, transfer or 
appreciation of wealth. Evans (2013) 
identifies five strong reasons as follows:
  Horizontal equity – the equal treatment 
of those with the same taxable capacity. 
  Vertical equity – the heavier taxation  
of those with greater taxable capacity, 
usually interpreted as progressive 
taxation.
  Efficiency – It is suggested that 
because a wealth tax imposes a  
charge on wealth irrespective of the 
income that derives from the underlying 
assets, it acts as an encouragement to 
use the assets more productively. For 
example, a wealth tax will encourage 
people to cultivate or develop land  
or sell it to someone who will use it 
more productively.
  Administrative, in that such taxes can 
provide the revenue authority with very 
useful data that can help check  
and prevent evasion of other taxes.
  Political signalling – letting those 
without wealth know that it is not just 
they that have to make all the sacrifices 
in times of financial hardship (when 
welfare provision is continually being 
curtailed and incomes are not rising).
Opponents of wealth taxes might argue 
that those with higher incomes already 
pay a large proportion of total income tax. 
In 2012/13 those earning an income of 
more than £150,000 (the top one per 
cent of earners in the UK that year) paid 
27 per cent of the total tax bill of all 
income taxpayers and paid more than 35 
per cent on average of those earnings in 
taxation, rising to 45.4 per cent for those 
on earning of more than £2m – HMRC 
Rates and Statistics Table 2.5, 2013). As 
there is a large cross-over from this group 
to the most wealthy in asset terms, some 
justification for an additional tax on wealth 
would need to be given to show how, 
overall, this group were treated fairly  
and proportionately. Alternatively, better 
targeting of asset-rich, but income poor, 
individuals may be required. This raises 
political concerns however, as groups 
falling into such categories would be 
those with significant housing wealth in 
their own home, which might then have  
to be sold, or have charges added to it for 
future payment on eventual sales. Neither 
of these options would be likely to go 
down well with voters.
However, there could be further value  
in the differentiation between earned  
and inherited wealth in developing wealth 
taxation in the UK. Such tax reform could 
help to make the taxing of the wealthy 
more fair in public eyes – ie, those who 
earned their own wealth would be treated 
differently from those who inherited  
and were wealthy by luck of birth. 
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This section has demonstrated  
the significant difficulties associated with 
the development of additional or wider  
wealth taxes. The following three sections 
review the three options for wealth tax 
reform in further depth. 
Taxing ownership of wealth
 
The UK does not have an annual wealth 
tax or a single tax on the ownership of 
wealth (nor has it had one in modern tax 
history) but there are a number of related 
taxes, including council tax. Council  
tax is paid by renters as well as owner-
occupiers but the amount levied is related 
to the property value. However, there are 
a number of problems with council tax, not 
least the fact that it is based on property 
valuations dating back to 1991. The final 
Lyons report suggested that, in the 
medium term, the government should 
revalue council tax to update the tax base 
and improve fairness. It also suggested 
that new bands should be introduced to 
reduce bills for those in the lowest value 
properties. This would be paid for by 
increased bills for those in higher value 
properties. In the longer term, however, 
Lyons suggested that future governments 
could consider more radical reform 
options such as local income tax or 
re-localisation of the business rate. There 
has been no revaluation since the Lyons 
review other than in Wales where tax  
bills based on property revaluations were 
issued in 2005 (using 2003 prices). The 
increase in house prices over the late 
1990s and early 2000s meant that more 
than a third of properties in Wales moved 
to a band higher than under the 1991 
valuation. Some properties moved up by 
up to four bands. The Welsh government 
also introduced a new top band (Band I). 
So we do not currently have a  
property tax as such but could consider 
introducing one. Indeed, the tax treatment 
of owner-occupation is certainly 
anomalous at the moment. It distorts  
any move to fairer taxation (as well as 
impeding the shift to a more balanced 
housing system overall). Harrop (2013) 
argues precisely for this to tackle both 
inter- and intra-generational inequalities. 
Liability could be rolled up into a charge 
on the eventual sale of the property if 
some cannot afford to pay it. Harrop 
(2013) argues for a debate about  
housing taxation to restrain (perhaps  
even reverse?) property price rises (in 
relation to earnings) and provide funding 
for house building to help younger 
generations and those with low  
levels of wealth more generally. 
The Chinese government recently brought 
in a property tax to stop house prices 
increasing but as soon as it was 
announced there was a panic to sell and 
house prices spiked. According to the 
Financial Times, there has also been a 
spike in the number of divorces as this 
was one way of avoiding the tax! This 
example is perhaps a helpful reminder  
of the pitfalls of introducing new taxes 
without considerable planning, and even 
then, that containing the effects of tax 
changes on wider behaviour and taxpayer 
choices is notoriously difficult.
The introduction of a new property tax 
would be a radical reform and is unlikely 
to be popular in a country where home 
ownership, as an institution, verges on  
he sacred. A ‘mansion tax’, however,  
has been widely debated recently and  
this does appear to be a feasible new tax. 
This proposes a flat rate tax on properties 
valued at £2m or more. While this could 
suffer from the wealth tax valuation 
problems, District Valuers probably have  
a good idea how many properties are in 
this price bracket (estimated to be around 
70,000 nationwide). It would not be too 
difficult to find them (houses are not 
movable forms of wealth of course, so 
they are much harder to hide than other 
forms of wealth) and the government 
could put a hefty penalty on non-
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disclosure to reduce the impact of 
preferential ownership being obscured by 
clever legal structures. However, with only 
a limited number of properties that would 
fall under this tax, even if potentially high 
rates were set, the sums of money raised 
would be relatively small and so such a 
policy might end up being be more about 
political signalling than significant wealth 
redistribution in itself. It would be easier, 
politically, to introduce this than to reform 
council tax which would affect the 
population more widely. 
A further issue that will need to be 
considered in introducing a revised 
council tax valuation policy, however, is 
the impact of the variation in local property 
prices. A £2m property in London is not 
the same as a £2m property in the East 
Midlands. It might be possible to have 
different thresholds in different areas  
(eg, through having a certain multiple of 
average property prices in each area).
However, such a move might also reduce 
further the number of properties that 
would be taxable under this policy and 
would introduce highly unusual local 
variations in tax rates.
In addition to property taxation, greater 
taxation of the land on which taxable 
property sits (land value tax) has received 
significant political attention in recent 
years (not a new idea, but one that has 
been debated since the days of Adam 
Smith!). Land is a limited resource (the UK 
isn’t getting appreciably bigger) and its 
use and control is therefore a particularly 
important asset for management in the 
national interest. The significance of 
tranches of land varies not just by size  
but by potential use as inner/near city land 
for development differs in economic value 
significantly from rural or more remote 
land. Where land is not made available for 
‘best’ use then society is likely to be the 
poorer collectively. Given land itself is not 
heavily taxed in the UK, the opportunity 
exists to use the tax system to encourage 
effective and efficient use of land. A land 
value tax policy might do this by attaching 
taxes to land that would encourage those 
owning it to make the most effective use 
they could of it. Such a tax could be 
varied to seek particular uses that are to 
society’s maximum benefit (eg, reduction 
in land taxation where it was given over  
to affordable housing compared to say, 
commercial usage). Similarly banking of 
land, limiting its availability for other use, 
would be made a more costly activity 
potentially releasing important tracts of 
land for development. A number of 
countries around the world have land 
value taxes at national or regional levels 
(Denmark, the US – Pennsylvania, 
Australia – New South Wales, Singapore 
and Hong Kong, to name a few). Ireland 
promised one in 2010, to commence  
from 2013, but then backed down on this 
proposal under political pressure. It has 
also formed part of discussions about 
funding a post-devolution Scotland, and 
lessons could perhaps usefully be applied 
to the UK from these cases as part of a 
reform of wealth taxation where advocates 
claim this form of taxation even helps a 
country improve its recession-proofing (as 
reduced ‘rent seeking’ use of wealth links 
it more closely to productive activity). The 
IFS Mirrlees Review (2011) also provided 
specific analysis of the potential for a 
‘Land Value Tax’ in the UK.
Taxing wealth transfers
Wealth transfer taxes are associated with 
the passing of wealth from one owner to 
another. As such, the forms of taxation 
most commonly falling into this category 
are taxes on death and taxes on giving 
assets away in life (gift and trust taxes).
Inheritance tax (IHT) is the UK tax under 
which taxes on death and gift taxes in life 
are charged. However, it raises very little 
at present (in the UK it raised less than 
one per cent of tax receipts in 2012/13 
for the government and each year around 
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95 per cent of all estates pay no IHT). 
Further, unlike most OECD countries,  
in the UK IHT is not in fact a tax on 
inheritance, but a tax on the estate, 
meaning wealth transfers on death are  
not taxed in the hands of the recipient at 
all. It is only based on the wealth of the 
person passing it on in death. Despite all 
this, it continues to be strangely unpopular 
with the public as a form of taxation. Its 
opponents make claims of it being an 
unfair double taxation on hard-working 
citizens who have already paid tax(es)  
on their wealth in life. While this is in part 
untrue, for example, it is one of the only 
times a gain made by owning your own 
home becomes taxable, not a double tax 
entirely therefore in many cases, people 
often feel passionately about the ability to 
pass down wealth on death to recipients 
of their choosing – recipients who very 
rarely include the tax authorities! As such, 
any suggestions of reform to make this a 
more important wealth tax meet with 
significant public concern. Therefore, 
while there is an argument for root and 
branch reform, governments have been 
reluctant to do this. 
Other issues with UK IHT include its 
relative generosity to farmers and 
business owners compared to others, as 
these groups get exemptions for larger 
sums than others. Such a system perhaps 
helps to reflect a difference in the taxation 
of earned and unearned wealth (the 
possible need for more of which was 
discussed earlier) but does so at best 
fairly crudely, as it does not differentiate 
the source of the wealth that exists within 
the business or that bought the farm. 
Further, the richer you are the more likely 
it is you can avoid IHT through use of 
trusts (though many such loopholes have 
been closed recently) or through directly 
giving wealth away before death. This is 
because you have less need for all of your 
wealth to meet your basic needs the 
richer you are. This points to poor 
targeting of this tax, perhaps contributing 
further to its relative unpopularity. 
In response, claims by its supporters  
are made that this is a once-in-a-lifetime 
chance to rebalance the distribution of 
wealth as it passes from one generation 
to the next. If reform of IHT was to be 
undertaken, various alternative models 
exist the government should consider.  
For example, the Irish Capital Acquisition 
Tax (CAT) system is a model that seeks  
to directly address some of the current 
limitations the UK’s IHT arguably suffers 
from as an effective tax to aid wealth 
redistribution. The Irish CAT has been in 
place since the mid 1970s and uses three 
thresholds, one for each of three receipt 
sources the donee may receive over their 
lifetime. These thresholds form the basis 
for both gift and IHT computations on a 
year-by-year basis. Once a threshold of 
gifts/inheritances you can receive from a 
particular source has been reached, any 
more from that particular source is subject 
to a full rate of CAT (currently 33 per cent 
since December 2012, rising from 31 per 
cent for the 12 months before this, and 
25 per cent before that for some years). 
As such, this system continues to use a 
fixed rate of tax (a rate currently lower 
than higher personal income tax rates in 
Ireland, as IHT is in the UK) and doesn’t 
vary based on the tax rate of the donee, 
as a more radical move to a true tax in 
inheritance might suggest. Where it 
differs from the current UK system, 
however, is that the thresholds differ in 
level based on the relationship you have 
with the donor, providing constraints on 
the tax-free receipts from any one source 
a donee can obtain before tax begins to 
be due. 
We have found little data on the impact of 
this tax, nor on whether compliance is an 
issue. At face value however, we suspect 
that this form of applying a structured 
wealth tax on inheritance and gifts would 
help redistribute wealth as it would likely 
encourage the spreading of gifts/
inheritances more widely (eg, more 
directly to second generation/more  
distant relatives or worthy causes rather 
than just to direct offspring). It also means 
that where such inheritance spreading 
does not occur by itself, those who have 
received the most in the past pay most 
taxes on future receipts. Further research 
here would be very interesting.
 
It seems therefore that various options 
exist that would address some of the key 
issues with the use of IHT in the UK at 
present, making it a more effective tax in 
achieving wealth distribution impacts. A 
variety of alternative systems are being 
applied in other countries. The move to 
more of a donee-based tax for gifts and 
inheritances would be following the global 
trend more than continuing with the UK’s 
current estate/donor-based approach. 
Politically however, this tax is a difficult 
one to change given significant public 
disquiet about it as an ‘unfair’ double tax 
despite the facts of its minimal impact on 
most people’s tax contributions over life.
Taxing wealth appreciation
The third area of wealth taxes typically 
found in developed economies is the 
taxation of wealth appreciation. This is the 
key wealth tax category for revenue raising 
for governments, albeit raising relatively 
low sums compared to income and 
consumption taxes. In the UK in 2011/12, 
for example, the key individual wealth 
transfer tax – capital gains tax (CGT) 
– raised £4.3bn (approximately one per 
cent of taxes received that year). Even as 
the most significant personal wealth tax, 
CGT is paid by relatively few individuals. 
In 2009/10 (the latest figures available),  
only 164,000 people paid any CGT 
(compared with almost 31million who paid 
at least some income tax). This is due in 
part to a relatively high threshold at which 
CGT becomes due in the UK, compared 
to countries such as Australia, where no 
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threshold exists, which means that anyone 
with any gains from selling a chargeable 
asset has to observe the CT rules and  
pay over, often small, CGT sums. 
CGT is not paid by companies, only 
individuals. Companies instead pay 
corporation tax (an income not wealth  
tax) on any capital gains they make. This 
means that determining the full wealth 
appreciation tax receipts the government 
receives in any year is not straightforward 
to determine from public sources.
The reason wealth appreciation is taxed  
at the point of sale, rather than when 
appreciation occurs over time, is a 
practical one. Until such time as a sale 
occurs, the actual gain to be made is 
uncertain (unrealised). It only therefore 
makes sense to charge taxation at the 
point this gain crystallises in a sale and so 
wealth appreciation taxation tends to be 
done on this basis in the main. Tax on 
appreciation in value pre-sale may also 
require part disposal of the asset (if the 
asset can be part disposed of) to fund the 
tax, if alternative sources of income are 
not available to be used to cover this 
obligation. This is not likely to be efficient 
management of the asset base, as the 
sale is occurring solely for tax reasons.  
It is also likely to dissuade the holding of 
assets long term, which would not be a 
positive step for an economy needing 
greater distribution of asset ownership  
to decrease its citizens’ reliance on  
the state.
CGT has been a tax that has undergone 
significant change in recent years. 
Currently it is charged at either 18 per 
cent or 28 per cent (over a threshold of 
£10,900) based on the level of income 
tax paid by the asset’s owner. As such 
CGT is in part linked to income tax rules. 
However, exceptions to these basic rules 
allow for some variability in rates paid by 
individuals in practice. For example, in 
2007, private equity boss, Nicholas 
Ferguson of SVG Capital, criticised 
capital gains tax rules which allowed 
buy-out firm managers to pay as little as 
10 per cent on profits derived from assets 
held for more than two years. As Mr 
Ferguson told the Financial Times: ‘Any 
common sense person would say that a 
highly-paid private equity executive 
paying less tax than a cleaning lady  
or other low-paid workers, that can’t  
be right’. 
For these reasons, CGT is therefore a  
tax that is regularly in the spot-light as 
needing reform. As those with assets are 
able to release value stored to provide an 
alternative to earned income for living on, 
there is a strong argument that a tax on 
wealth appreciation is necessary for 
equity within any developed tax system. 
Why should those working to earn income 
be taxed on that income when those  
who receive similar sums to spend on 
consumption from selling assets and 
releasing unearned ‘income’, not pay tax 
on it. The ‘A buck, is a buck, is a buck’ 
argument! This was, in fact, the cited aim 
for CGT’s introduction in 1965. It was not 
intended to be a key revenue raiser, as it 
has proven not to be, but to improve the 
fairness of the overall tax system. It 
therefore had little in the way of real 
impact on wealth distribution. Despite 
this, its presence in the future in the tax 
system is likely to be assured on the 
overall equity basis.
This is not to say however, that reform is 
not needed on this tax. Areas for reform 
may include reassessment of the impact 
of the fixed rate CGT system introduced 
relatively recently in the UK, with a 
possible reversion to the prior system of 
the use of the marginal rate of income 
taxation for CGT. This would ensure that, 
at least for non-exempt or protected asset 
sales, gains were taxed fully as if they 
were an income source. This would 
arguably increase the equity of the system 
further and reduce the tax advantage  
to receiving income from a capital gain  
rather than from earned income for many, 
particularly higher rate or additional rate 
(paying 40 per cent or 45 per cent) 
taxpayers. 
However, a wealth appreciation tax,  
such as CGT, suffers from at least one 
key issue over earned income that a 
government must consider how to 
address – the impact of inflation.  
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As prices change over time in an inflation 
impacted society, asset values will alter 
solely linked with underlying inflation.  
A government must consider whether  
the tax system recognises this and only  
tax ‘real’ wealth appreciation (that which 
exceeds the impact of inflation alone), or 
whether to make this part of the taxable 
gain. In the UK we used to apply an 
inflation indexation to expressly recognise 
the impact of inflation changes. Now, in  
the name of simplification, the flat rate 
difference compared to the higher income 
tax rates is supposed to allow for some 
adjustment for inflation. However, this  
is clearly very crude (the rates are not 
adjusted for the length of ownership  
of assets so, for example, as much 
adjustment is made for someone  
owning an asset only briefly as for 
someone holding the asset for a  
long time) and therefore, in effect, the 
adjustment made for inflation in the  
UK’s system is no longer accurate.
 A key exemption that a future government 
may have to grapple with one day is the 
family home exemption from CGT. As their 
home is the largest single asset most 
people will own in their lifetime, exempting 
gains made by owning the house you live 
in is a very significant tax concession.  
This exemption cost a predicted £10bn  
in tax revenues foregone in 2012/13, 
making it currently one of the most 
expensive tax concessions in the UK’s  
tax system (after the personal allowance, 
which allows deductions from income  
tax for personal pension contributions, 
and does not collect VAT on new house 
builds). While developed countries around 
the world similarly do not generally tax 
gains made on people’s homes, an 
extended period of financial crisis may 
require some governments to look at this 
source of possible tax revenue in time, 
and a wealth appreciation tax may be the 
chosen route to tax some of this, even  
if only a small amount or over a large  
gain threshold.
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Philanthropy
Our discussion of wealth inequality, and 
of taxation to redress inequalities, may 
come across as overly negative for 
supporters of a market model of risk and 
reward who see wealth inequality as an 
inevitable consequence of encouraging 
risk taking. Such risk taking is often seen 
as a crucial activity for which higher 
expected reward is justifiable. Different 
propensities to take risk and different 
abilities to assess and size risk will create 
an unequal distribution of wealth. There 
are particular problems, of course, with 
this approach, such as where the risk is 
not borne by those who ‘earn’ the money. 
Here, tax payers may bear the risk while 
individuals take the rewards, for example 
in too-big-to-fail companies and in the 
bonus culture of executive remuneration  
in banks.
These and related problems aside, 
taxation of wealth may become 
problematic because the wealthy have 
means and motive to avoid it. Government 
can be left with a low yielding tax of 
questionable cost-benefit. Self interest 
leads to avoidance. Presuming people  
are motivated by self interest, discussion 
of ways to encourage a voluntary 
redistribution of wealth will be fruitful.  
The challenge for government then 
becomes one of how to take self interest 
and align this type of behaviour to  
benefit others.
There are mechanisms which make 
charitable giving very straightforward,  
not least when income is taken at source 
so the donor never sees the money. 
‘Payroll Giving’ lets a person donate  
a regular amount directly from salary, 
through the employer’s payroll. The 
donation is given before tax but after 
National Insurance is taken off. This 
simple process is run through the 
automated payroll but unfortunately  
those who are self-employed cannot 
access payroll giving. 
There are a number of comparison  
studies and papers making the case that 
US giving is twice as great as UK. For 
example, CAF (2006) found that the 
amount that individuals give to charity 
varies from 0.14 per cent of GDP in 
France to 1.7 per cent in the US, with  
the UK at 0.73 per cent. Also, different 
activities are philanthropically funded in 
each country, a good example being that, 
in the absence of the NHS and the BBC 
in the US, there is fundraising for health 
and public service broadcasting on that 
side of the Atlantic. European countries 
generally have higher levels of taxation 
and more investment in welfare services, 
hence they require lower levels of 
charitable donation for key services.  
The far higher number of billionaires  
and multi-millionaires in the US may  
also provide some explanation for the 
‘philanthropy gap’ alongside the higher 
level of practising religiosity in the US,  
as all faiths encourage followers to give 
money to good causes. 
Perhaps an even more important 
explanation lies in the different cultures  
of philanthropy (see Breeze and Lloyd 
2013). In the US, to be known as a 
philanthropist is an aspirational identity, 
with graduates of Ivy League universities 
competing to be the first in their class to 
donate and have a building named after 
themselves. And ‘The Giving Pledge’ 
involves billionaires (most notably Bill 
Gates and Warren Buffett) pledging to 
give half their wealth to charitable causes. 
In the UK, such activity may attract 
cynicism and criticism (eg, ‘they’re not 
giving enough’, ‘they’re only doing it for 
the tax break’, ‘it’s just about their ego’). 
As well as an under-developed giving 
culture, the UK may also have an under-
developed asking culture. Fundraising has 
only recently become professionalised 
and is still seen as little more than 
begging in many quarters – including  
by the leaders of charities who rely on 
donations! Fundraising is seen as ‘dirty 
work’ done by people who are shameless 
in raising the embarrassing issue of 
money. In the US many university leaders 
spend a huge percentage of their time 
actively going out and fundraising. Here 
VCs are only just starting to understand 
that supporting their development office  
is part of the job. 
The tax situations in the UK and US are 
similar due to the raft of legislation that 
began in the UK’s 1986 budget (which 
introduced Gift Aid), followed by the 
2000 Budget (which made all donations 
made by tax payers eligible for Gift Aid) 
and other minor changes made in many 
other budgets (eg, incentives for payroll 
giving in 2004, incentives to leave 
charitable legacies in 2012, etc). The one 
outstanding advantage that US donors 
enjoy is what they call the Charitable 
Remainder Trust, which some in the UK  
are campaigning for as ‘lifetime legacies’. 
Recent government policy in this area 
proposed removing tax relief on donations 
higher than £50,000 or 25 per cent  
of income, whichever was higher. The  
aim of this reform was not to discourage 
philanthropy but to reduce tax avoidance. 
However, this proposal was subject to a 
U-turn in May 2012 following opposition 
to the proposal from charities and wealth 
donors.
Breeze and Lloyd (2013) argue that  
the actual role tax plays in encouraging  
(or discouraging) donations is difficult  
to calculate, as the act of giving is 
undermined by admitting any form of self 
interest. The lack of data from HMRC 
makes it hard to test the figures, but what 
data there is indicates no change in giving 
significantly correlated with changes in tax 
levels which might serve as a proxy (eg, 
the recently introduced higher (now gone) 
and additional rates did not seem to spark 
more giving, despite being in effect a  
ten per cent or five per cent increase  
in the tax break). But insofar as donors 
recognise the nudge, they tend to say that 
they appreciate tax breaks because they 
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make their money go further, so they can 
give, for example, £600,000 and their 
favoured cause receives £1m. This is 
attractive but still costs them £600,000. 
There is also a practical aspect in that the 
existence of these reliefs forces the issue 
to be raised at crucial junctures in 
people’s lives, such as at the point of 
inheritance or liquidation. Big donors (eg, 
Tom Hunter) are on record as saying they 
gave away a lot at that point because an 
accountant or lawyer pointed out the 
benefits to them. In such cases they 
usually put the money into a charitable 
trust or foundation for distribution at a 
later date once they have worked out  
their philanthropic priorities, so there  
is no immediate impact on front-line 
charity income in the year such mega-
donations occur.
So how can philanthropy be encouraged 
whilst also reducing tax avoidance? 
Breeze and Lloyd (2013) provide 
numerous suggestions. First, they argue 
that philanthropy can be encouraged by 
emphasising that it enriches one’s life. 
Breeze surveyed 82 donors and 28 
philanthropy experts, with 20 in-depth 
interviews with donors. The overwhelming 
finding was that giving made them happy. 
However, ‘enrichment theory’ is difficult to 
use to encourage giving as the fact that it 
makes people happier and gives life more 
meaning is not apparent until after the 
gifts have been given! Other suggestions 
involve: seeking cross-party consensus  
to clarify a long-term strategy on 
philanthropy; exploring the role of 
‘matched funding’ by government 
possibly, instead of tax relief; encouraging 
charities to improve efforts in asking for 
support; improving after-care and 
stewardship of those who make 
significant gifts; encouraging 
philanthropists to talk more openly  
about giving and therefore act as role 
models for others.
Key points
  This Commission is focusing on wealth but a key way in which wealth is 
accumulated, is through saving from earned income. Over the last 30 years 
income inequality has grown dramatically and those at the very top of the 
income distribution have seen huge increases in their incomes which have 
subsequently fed through into wealth inequalities. Those on high incomes 
are also much more likely to receive an inheritance and/or lifetime gift and 
much more likely to receive one of high value.
  The 2013 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has proposed  
‘a radical re-shaping of remuneration’ in the finance sector and, more 
broadly, the UK is giving shareholders a binding say on pay policy and the 
powers to consider the differentials between the lowest and median paid 
workers but greater transparency and power for shareholders is vital to 
ensuring fairer rewards for work. 
  Ensuring fair rewards for work, not just at the top but also for those on lower 
wages, will create a fairer distribution of ‘original income’, thus reducing any 
need for redistribution. 
  There is often great disagreement about the overall level of income and 
wealth taxation but, whatever the level, there is then a question about the 
balance between these two types of taxation (and the balance between  
these and other forms of taxation). The Mirrlees Review called for a range  
of reforms of wealth taxation and these should be considered by the 
government.
  The UK does not currently have an annual wealth tax but council tax plays 
part of a role here. This tax is over-ripe for reform either wholesale or 
through incremental change (eg, the introduction of new bands at the  
top). The scope for a mansion tax and a land tax also needs more public 
consideration.
  If earned wealth is generally considered more worthy than unearned wealth, 
then reform of inheritance tax should be seriously reviewed. Turning this into 
a capital receipts tax rather than an estate tax, and capturing lifetime gifts in 
a more comprehensive way would make this a fairer tax though the practical 
and political challenges should not be underestimated. Further study of 
Ireland’s tax system in this regard could be very fruitful.
  Further reform of CGT is called for, potentially including a return to its 
application at marginal rates of income to reflect the nature of capital gains 
as an alternative form of income that is available to those with assets to call 
on when needed.
  Alongside wealth taxation, the wealthy could be encouraged to make 
increased charitable donations. One way of achieving this would be through 
further tax incentives but this runs the risk of encouraging tax avoidance.  
A government review of ways to support philanthropy would be welcome.
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Chapter 6
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The distribution of personal wealth in Britain is highly unequal with the overall 
share of the top tenth of the population in 2008/10 being more than 850 times 
the share of the bottom tenth. 
Levels of wealth ownership affect 
people’s physical and mental health, their 
education and employment opportunities, 
their ability to cushion themselves against 
financial shocks, their level of political 
power and so on. Wealth ownership is 
particularly important now, at a time of 
austerity, when wages are stagnating and 
social security benefits are being cut. So 
what should be done, if anything, about 
wealth inequality?
The broad aim of this Policy Commission 
was to stimulate debate around this 
important question. We found significant 
evidence about the links between wealth 
and a range of outcomes (as outlined in 
Chapter 2). But we need further research 
into what type and level of wealth 
inequality is (most) harmful, and for whom. 
For example, is it a greater problem that 
some people have no/negative wealth or 
that some have extremely high levels? 
This begs the question, of course, of what 
are ‘extremely high levels’. Are the ‘super 
rich’ the top one per cent, the top 0.1  
per cent or the top 0.05 per cent?  
What criteria might we use to make this 
judgement? Or should we focus on a 
broader group, say the top 10 per cent? 
One reason why the definition of those at 
‘the top’ matters is precisely in relation to 
policy reform. Which groups might be 
taxed more? And which groups might  
lose (universal) benefits, like child benefit 
or winter fuel payments, if it was decided 
to means-test or tax these benefits 
(further)? Income tax thresholds might be 
one way of categorising people for such 
purposes but income and assets are 
different and asset thresholds might also 
be important to determine alongside 
income thresholds. 
However we define, and treat, those ‘at 
the top’ of the wealth distribution, it is 
clear (see Chapter 2) that those with no  
or negative wealth (ie, net debt) are at a 
much greater disadvantage in life than 
those with moderate or high amounts of 
wealth. For example, they have no cushion 
to fall back on in times of need and 
certainly no ladder to help them climb  
up the socio-economic scale. In a society 
with a liberal welfare state, lack of private 
wealth puts people at a particular 
disadvantage and we might therefore 
argue that those at the bottom are the 
group with the greatest need of help. 
Policies designed to help them might  
not affect the overall level of wealth 
inequality much (as measured by the  
Gini coefficient) but might make a major 
difference to their lives.
Having said that, those ‘in the middle’, 
with some assets or the ability to 
accumulate some, will include the 
Conclusion
powerful ‘median voter’ that politicians 
from the main parties seek to attract.  
This group, again variously defined,  
has become more prominent in political 
debate with the term ‘squeezed middle’ 
used widely though, again, pertaining  
to the middle of the income distribution 
rather than the wealth distribution. 
Of course, within each of these groups 
there are particular segments of the 
population (including different age  
groups, genders, ethnicities and so on). 
This report does not go into detail about 
these groups but young people are a 
particular concern given that young 
people today are likely to be worse off 
compared with previous generations,  
the first time this has happened since  
data has been available on living 
standards. This raises issues of inter-
generational inequalities and inter-
generational transfers of wealth though, 
data suggests that inequality is much 
greater within than between generations.
The imperative to do something about 
wealth inequality may derive from concern 
about the impact of inequality on a range 
of outcomes. But it may also derive from 
concern about fairness and social justice. 
There are, clearly, widely differing 
conceptions of fairness and justice,  
with those prioritising individual freedom 
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(eg, to own private property) pitted 
against those prioritising equality (eg, 
through more collective forms of wealth). 
Hills et al. (2013) suggest the possibility 
of some common ground between these 
two broad political philosophies as those 
born with no wealth have, effectively, 
much less freedom than those born into 
wealthy families. Indeed, the idea of 
‘capital grants’ (giving young people a 
substantial financial asset at age 18 or 
perhaps 21) often appeals to people from 
across the political spectrum as a way of 
promoting both freedom and equality. 
Arguments for capital grants or citizen’s 
inheritance go back a long way. In Agrarian 
Justice, Thomas Paine (1795–6) wrote:
  In advocating the case of the persons 
thus dispossessed, it is a right, and not 
a charity… [Government must] create 
a national fund, out of which there 
shall be paid to every person, when 
arrived at the age of twenty-one years, 
the sum of fifteen pounds sterling, as  
a compensation in part, for the loss  
of his or her natural inheritance, by  
the introduction of the system of 
landed property.
Such ideas may appear radical, and  
would certainly be costly if implemented  
in a meaningful way but the Child Trust 
Fund was based at least partly, if also 
loosely, on such ideas and research on 
the impact of the Child Trust Fund would 
help explore the case for such policies.
Discussions of fairness and social justice 
bring issues of morality into the debate 
and notions of ‘moral economy’. Following 
on from the work of E.P.Thompson 
(1971), Karl Polanyi (1968), Andrew 
Sayer (2000) and others, the idea of  
a ‘moral economy’ reminds us that  
‘the market is a social and political 
construction that is steadily shaped and 
re-shaped by social, political and moral 
struggles.’ (Bolton and Laaser 2013: 
514). Collective notions of fairness (or  
‘lay morality’ as Sayer refers to it) are 
therefore important in balancing economic 
factors with ethical norms. Public views 
therefore matter here and we should 
therefore turn to, and engage with, public 
opinion, to consider perceptions of 
fairness and justice. 
It is highly likely that some degree of 
wealth inequality is generally accepted  
by the public as fair and socially just. This 
could be for a number of reasons. For 
example, older people will have had more 
time to save than younger people and so 
their greater level of wealth is simply a 
reflection of lifecycle factors rather than 
any systemic injustice. Wealth inequality 
also occurs because people on similar 
levels of income will have different 
preferences for saving as opposed  
to spending and, again, the resulting 
inequalities might generally be accepted 
as fair. We might also accept that some 
people will earn more than others due  
to higher levels of skill and effort, and  
so have greater capacity to save. Some 
people will also have the wisdom or good 
luck to invest in housing and financial 
assets just before they increase 
substantially in value. And, finally, we 
might also accept that parents will have 
different abilities and propensities to pass 
on wealth to their children, though we 
might also feel that ‘unearned’ wealth 
(through inheritance) is less deserved 
than ‘earned wealth’. The extent of wealth 
inequality, however, appears to go far 
beyond what can be explained and 
justified by these factors. 
While this report has focused on  
wealth inequality, the basic root of these 
inequalities is income inequality and this 
needs to be tackled alongside inequalities 
in wealth. However, if we focus on wealth 
inequality, then there is much that can be 
done by a range of actors: central and 
local government; the financial services 
sector; the third sector; and individuals 
themselves. We therefore conclude this 
report by listing some of the policy ideas 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 3,  
4 and 5.
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Policy recommendations
For those with very little, no or negative 
wealth
  Low incomes (either through social 
security benefits or wages) need to  
be increased to reduce levels of 
problem debt and give people the 
chance to save.
  Funding for debt advice and Credit 
Unions is vital to support people to 
reduce debt, avoid expensive forms  
of credit and save.
  Payday lending needs tougher 
regulation and banking services for 
those on the lowest incomes need  
to improve. 
  People on the lowest incomes need 
better support to save. Further thought 
needs to be given to how a ‘Saving 
Gateway’ or similar scheme can  
be funded.
  Other ways of encouraging saving 
should also be developed, including 
auto-enrolment into savings accounts 
when people start a new job and ‘save 
the change’ savings accounts linked  
to credit and debit cards. 
  Means tests on savings for workers 
receiving Universal Credit should also 
be reviewed as a possible disincentive 
to save for such groups.
  An organisation which solely 
represents the interests of savers 
should be established. 
For those ‘in the middle’ with some assets
  Housing policy and housing finance 
both need a thorough review to ensure 
that supply can meet demand. Without 
increased housing supply, government 
support for lending merely props up 
the relatively high house prices which 
are also part of the problem. 
  Innovation in housing finance should 
be explored. This has the potential to 
boost affordability by reducing the 
extent to which owners have to buy 
into the investment return on their 
property and to enable both risk and 
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profit-sharing in relation to house price 
appreciation (which gives those who 
do not usually benefit from housing 
investment returns – eg, renters – the 
opportunity to do so).
  The government should review ways  
of helping people to access the equity 
in their homes. For example, equity 
borrowing among home buyers of 
working age is common and can be 
risky. This needs to be made safer. 
Equity release for people without 
earned income (retired cash-poor 
households) is costly and so some 
ways to share the risks involved in 
equity release products, perhaps 
involving government, might be  
helpful here.
  Ways to increase the amount saved  
in occupational pensions (beyond 
default levels) needs further thought.
  Development of ‘Defined Ambition’ 
pension schemes, which share the  
risk between saver, employer (and 
potentially state) should be given 
further consideration.
For those ‘at the top’
  Remuneration policies need re-
shaping, for example, by giving 
shareholders a binding say on pay 
policy and the powers to consider the 
differentials between the lowest and 
median paid workers but greater 
transparency and power for 
shareholders is vital to ensuring  
fairer rewards for work. 
  Ensuring fair rewards for work, not just 
at the top but also for those on lower 
wages will create a fair distribution of 
‘original income’ thus reducing any 
need for redistribution. 
  The Mirrlees Review called for a range 
of reforms of wealth taxation and these 
should be considered seriously by  
the government.
  Council tax is over-ripe for reform 
either wholesale or through incremental 
change (eg, the introduction of new 
bands at the top). The scope for a 
mansion tax and a land tax also needs 
more public consideration.
  Greater consideration should also be 
given to the idea of taxing the returns 
on investment for owner occupiers in 
the same way as they are taxed for  
any other property (or financial asset) 
investor. This could be restricted to 
gains above a certain amount or to 
gains accrued by people in a certain 
wealth band. Or governments could 
decide to make interest on savings  
for people without housing wealth  
tax free in the same way as housing 
investment returns are tax free. Parity 
across the tenure divide in the 
treatment of returns on savings/
investments should be reviewed. 
  If earned wealth is generally 
considered more worthy than unearned 
wealth, then reform of inheritance tax 
should be seriously reviewed. Turning 
this into a capital receipts tax rather 
than an estate tax, and capturing 
lifetime gifts in a more comprehensive 
way would make this a fairer tax though 
the practical and political challenges 
should not be underestimated. Further 
study of Ireland’s tax system in this 
regard could be very fruitful.
  Further reform of CGT is called for, 
potentially including a return to its 
application at marginal rates of income 
to reflect its nature as an alternative 
form of income that is available to those 
with assets to call on when needed.
  Ways to encourage philanthropic 
giving (without encouraging tax 
avoidance) should be reviewed.
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Key questions
Topic 1: Existing knowledge base
1.1  Is there any additional, and in 
particular more up-to-date, evidence 
of the extent and nature of wealth 
inequality (please refer to ‘Wealth 
Inequality: Key Facts’ paper)
1.2   What gaps in the evidence base 
remain and how could they be filled?
Topic 2: Is wealth inequality a problem?
2.1   Do people have equal/similar 
opportunities to accumulate wealth? 
Where there are unequal 
opportunities, why is this?
2.2   Is wealth inequality linked to social 
mobility? If yes, in what way?
2.3   Do assets have an effect on life 
chances independent of income?
2.4   Why do (some) people need/want  
to forego consumption in order to 
accumulate (different types of) 
assets?
2.5   What are the barriers to 
accumulating wealth (eg, housing 
wealth, savings and private 
pensions)?
2.6   Should wealth accumulated through 
lifetime gifts/inheritance be seen 
differently from wealth accumulated 
through saving from income or 
through increases in the value of 
existing wealth?
2.7   Is wealth inequality (largely) the 
result of lifecycle factors and the 
choices some people make to work 
harder and save more of their income 
than others?
2.8   Does the opportunity to accumulate 
large amounts of wealth provide 
incentives for entrepreneurs, to the 
benefit of the economy, and society 
as a whole?
2.9   Is wealth inequality damaging to 
social cohesion and/or democratic 
processes?
2.10   Are some forms of wealth inequality 
more/less damaging/helpful?
Topic 3: Policy options
3.1   How can we spread opportunities to 
accumulate different kinds of wealth?
3.2   How can we help those with 
moderate amounts of different kinds 
of wealth to maximise the benefits 
from wealth-holding?
3.3   Can the practical challenges 
presented by certain kinds of wealth 
taxes (eg, a lifetime transfer tax or 
land tax) be overcome?
 
Appendix A
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Policy Commission work programme
Scoping phase of the Commission
Activities included:
  Developing the idea for the Policy 
Commission with University of 
Birmingham academics and 
Commissioners.
  Launching the Policy Commission at 
the Conservative Party Conference 
(October 2012) with a debate on 
‘Wealth: are we all in it together?’ 
chaired by David Urquhart – Bishop  
of Birmingham and Chair of the 
Birmingham Policy Commission. 
Panellists included Mark Florman 
(Director of the Centre for Social 
Justice), Robert Hutton (Bloomberg  
UK Political Correspondent), Fraser 
Nelson (Editor of The Spectator), 
Matthew Sinclair (Chief Executive of 
the Taxpayers’ Alliance), and Professor 
Karen Rowlingson (Co-academic lead 
of the Commission).
  Appointing the Commissioners.
  Commissioner meetings to agree  
the content and process of the  
Policy Commission.
  Linking to the work of the Centre for 
Household Savings and Management 
(CHASM) and other University of 
Birmingham research.
  The Birmingham Brief: ‘Wealth 
inequality – are we “one nation”, all  
in it together?’ commenting on the 
‘one-nation’ debate between the 
Labour and Conservative visions  
for the future prosperity of Britain
  http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/
research/impact/thebirminghambrief/
items/2012/10/Wealth-inequality---
are-we-one-nation,-all-in-it-together.
aspx 
Evidence gathering and deliberation 
phase of the Commission
  Two half-day workshops to hear  
and deliberate evidence from policy-
makers, practitioners and academics: 
	   One workshop linked to the London 
School of Economics’ Centre  
for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
(CASE), including contributions 
from John Hills (Professor of Social 
Policy and Director of CASE), Eleni 
Karagiannaki (Research Officer, 
CASE), Dr Abigail McKnight (Toyota 
Senior Research Fellow, CASE), 
and Sir Tony Atkinson (Centennial 
Professor, LSE).
	   The second workshop attracted 
experts from across the policy 
spectrum including Danny Dorling 
(Professor of Public Understanding 
of Social Science, University of 
Sheffield), Diane Elson (Chair of 
Women’s Budget Group and 
Professor of Sociology, University of 
Essex), Andrew Harrop (Director, 
Fabian Society), Steve Lowe 
(Director of External Affairs and 
Customer Insight, Just Retirement), 
Nicky Edwards (Head of Public 
Affairs, Just Retirement), Howard 
Reed (Director, Landman 
Economics), and Matthew Sinclair 
(Taxpayers Alliance).
  Commissioner meetings to reflect on 
the issues raised at the workshops  
and to deliberate policy options.
  Meetings with key policy figures 
including David Hartnett (Permanent 
Secretary for HMRC, 2005-2012), 
James Plunkett (Director of Policy  
and Development at the Resolution 
Foundation), and Chris Evans 
(Professor of Taxation, University  
of New South Wales).
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  Public debates including one policy-
focussed debate in Committee Room 
1 of the House of Lords, and one 
publically-orientated debate at  
the University of Birmingham’s 
Community Day.
  Exploring broad opinion on the 
distribution of wealth in the UK through 
filming ‘vox-pops’ with members of the 
public in Birmingham.
  Vice Chancellor’s Select Dinner  
to discuss issues raised in the 
Commission with national experts 
including Steve Webb MP, Minister of 
State with responsibility for Pensions 
(Department for Work and Pensions).
  Paper by Dr Paul Cox on Pensions  
and Wealth in the 55-64 age group, 
for the NEST Annual Forum, 2013.
  Commissioners’ meetings to finalise 
the findings and recommendations.
Contributions to the Policy 
Commission
To inform its deliberations, the 
Commission consulted a wide range  
of experts who contributed to the 
Commission’s work.
  Written submissions and additional 
references provided to the Commission 
are available here: http://www.
birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/
policy-commissions/wealth/written-
evidence.aspx
  Summaries of discussions with experts 
are available here: http://www.
birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/
policy-commissions/wealth/evidence.
aspx 
 
The Policy Commission heard and deliberated on evidence from a range of sources, agreed conclusions 
and recommendations, and explored these further through national and local public events.
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Policy and Public Affairs Coordinator
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the contributions from the following:
61Birmingham Policy Commission on the Distribution of Wealth
Atkinson, A (1997) Public economics in 
action, Oxford: Oxford University Press
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